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ABSTRACT 
In 1384, the first malor system upgrade to the Grumman 
F-1t. began. Despite meeting all major acquisition milestones 
and being within budget, the program was terminated by the 
Department of Defense in 1991. This cancellation '"ms not only 
controversial within the Naval community, but 
importantly, indicated a major shift in the criteria used by 
decision makers to evaluate program success. This thesis 
the decision-making process surroundi:lg the 
Government's decision to modify and later cancel the F-14 
upgrade. Research indicates that as the defense budge': 
shrinks, acquisition program formulation and execution becomes 
much larger than the manipulation of cost, schedule, and 
performance. The Service must define, defend, and execute its 
acquisition strategies to address the political concerns of 
the U.S. Congress, Industry, and the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense. Lessons learned from the F-14 upgrade will help 
future Program Mangers understand shifting organizational and 
political dynamics within the system acquisition process. 
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Departnent of Defense system acquisi tien management 
lengthy and intricate prc8ess involving substantial technical 
difficulties and political uncertainties. In his thesis" The 
F-14 Contract: A Case study in Major Weapon System Acquisition 
and Program Management", Jon McIver discussed the genes~s of 
the Grumman F-14 prcgrarr, and the prcblerr,~~ involved \-lith 
contract forrr,ulittion. As a follow-on project, this thesis 
examines the modernization of the F-14 froTll a system 
acquisition management perspective. 
Most defense systems undergo modification throughout their 
life cycle. A typical tactical aircraft, for exanple, 
undergoes four to five major modifications after deployment 
[Ref. 1:p. 16-1]. Systems are modified for three primary 
reasons: to increase system performance with new technology; 
to counter emerging enemy threats; and to correct system 
deficiencies discovered dUring operational perfornance. The 
underlying theme with all upgrades is that they extend the 
system's life and offer a cost-effective alternative to new 
\-Ieapan procurement. 
In many respects, the strategic planning for a 
nodification is similar to new system development. Due to the 
complex nature and high cost of modern weapons, key decision 
makers draft strategies and build coalitions to achieve their 
goals. From an organizational and political perspective, 
there are three key participants in defense acquisition: the 
Executive Branch of the Federal Government, which formulates, 
directs, and executes national secur i ty pol icy; the 
Legislative Branch, which authorizes and funds defense 
programs; and Industry, which designs and pJ;"oduces the defense 
system. 
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH 
The reduction of available government resources has left 
both the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government ·,,·ith 
~ewer options to meet the security needs of the nation. 
the defense budget continues to shrink, Program Managers ·",ill 
need to understand the dynamics involved with defense policy 
formulation and implementation. with this basis, the 
objective of this research is to perform a comprehensive 
historical study of the F-14 upgrade program from 1974 to 
1992. This thesis will examine and analyze the political and 
organizational processes involved with defense policy 
formulation and implementation. The conclusions drawn from 
the F-14 upgrade program will help future Program Managers 
understand the interaction of departmental services, Office of 
the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Congress and their 
impact on weapon system acquisition. Armed with this 
;';:nowledge, the Program Manager will be in a stronger position 
to define, defend, and execute his acquisition prograra in a 
manner which addresses the concerns of key decision makers. 
C. SCOPE 
This thesis is a case study of the F-14 upgrade program. 
The study focuses on the decisions made by the Oepartrr.ent of 
the Navy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the U.S. 
Congress fran program inception until program ter:r.ination. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
What organizational and political factors were 
involved in the decision to modify the F-14 and what can 
Program Managers learn from the success and failure of this 
major program upgrade? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
How does Congress influence the formulation and 
implementation of national defense policy? 
b. Ho"", do Department of Defense Acquisition Managers 
market programs to Congress? 
c. How does the Department of Defense manage major 
weapon system modification programs? 
d. What factors in t.he acquisition process 
significantly affect cost, schedule and performance? 
What were the major modifications to the F-l4 and 
hovi did the Department of the Navy manage this upgrade? 
f. What conclusions can the Navy draw from the F-l4 
upgrade program? 
g. Who were the major players in the decision to 
terrrinate the F-l40? What organizational and political 
tactors were involved in this decision? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The information used in this thesis was obtained by 
several methods. A search of current and past literature was 
performed from Department of Defense Directives and 
Instructions, as .... 'ell as, Reports from the Office of the 
Secretary of Oefense(OSO), Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
and General Accounting Office (GAO). Archival data was 
collected through Defense Logistics Studies Informaticn 
Exchange (DLSIE) computer literature search, Defense Technical 
Information center (OTIC) and other library sources at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. Historical F-14D program documents 
such as the acquisition strategy, operational requirements 
document, reports to Congress and congressional ccrrespondence 
'.:ere extensively used, 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized in the following manner: 
Chapter I prov ides general comments, thesis obj ecti vC:.s, 
research questions, scope and assumptions, methodology, and 
organizntion of the study. 
Chapter II outlines the procedures used by Congress to 
control weClpon system acquisition. It includes a discussion 
on budget formulation and implementation and congressional 
oversight of the acquisition process. 
Chapter III examines the Executive Branch of Governrr.ent 
and its role in the defense acquisition process. The 
fur.ctions of the Defense Acquisition Soard (DAB), Planning, 
?rogranming I and Budgeting System (?PBS), and prograrr. 
management design are discussed to establ ish a fi~m foundation 
for analyzing the F-14 upgrade program. 
Chapter IV examines the genesis of the F-14 upgrade 
program to include requirements generation, acquisition 
strategy, and program management. Events which led to the 
ter:nination of the F-14D will be analyzed. The inpact of the 
F/A-l8 program, the shifting political environment, and intra-
organizational differences within 000 will be discussed. 
Chapter V analyzes the decision-making process involved in 
the F-14 upgrade program through the use of Allison's 
Bureaucratic Politics Model. Conclusions concerning the 
research are presented. 
Appendix A is a case study for use in the Acquisition and 
contracting curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Appendix B contains questions that a case study 
facilitator can use in the classroom to lead a successfUl 
discussion. 
THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 
INTRODUCTION 
To understand the dynamics behind policy fomulation and 
implementation, it is necessary to understand the environ:nent 
in '.,'hich decisions are made, The environment in which defense 
acquisition occurs is s"'1aped, in large measure, by the roles, 
objectives, and perspectives of its major participants. This 
chapter familiarizes the reader ..... ith one of the key players. 
the U,S, Congress, and its role in the defense acquisition 
process, For purposes of this study, the Legislative Branch 
(the Congress) includes the "Defense Comnittees": the Senate 
and House Arned Services Committees and the Defense 
Subcommittees of the senate and House Appropriation 
Comll'.i ttees; the Senate and House Budget Committees; other 
committees having legislative oversight of defense activities; 
individual members of Congress: the Congressional Budget 
Office and the General Accounting Office. 
THE CONGRESSIONAL STRUCTURE 
The Legislative Branch of Government conducts the 
preponderance of its work through the C011'.mi ttee system, The 
major committees responsible for legislation pertaining to the 
defense budget are the Budget COllUl'li ttees, the Amed Serv ices 
coromi ttees, and the Appropr iation Coromi ttees. 
1. Budget committees 
The primary responsibility of the Budget COf.'.mittee is 
to fomulate the congressional budget plan. This budget plan, 
called the Budget Resolution, indicates Congress' overall 
spending priorities. Once adopted by the full Congre:'?s, the 
Budget Resolution establishes congressional fiscal policy for 
the upcoming year . 
.Authorization committees 
The Armed Services Committee of both chambers of 
Congress is responsible for creating and modifying programs 
relating to the common defense of the L'nited states. The 
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) derives its authority 
and power from Senate standing Rule XXV which provides that 
"all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, as well as 
matters relating to the common defense, the Department of 
Defense, and its subordinate departments ... and other national 
defense issues, shall be referred to the SASC." [Ref. 2: p. 
19J The House Armed services Committee (HASCl is given 
similar power and authority by standing Rule X of the House, 
'""ith the exception of the appointment review privilege. 
[Ref. 3:pp. 350-351]. 
Appropriation Committees 
The Appropriations committee of both the House and 
Senate is responsible for allocating funds to authorized 
programs. The Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) also 
derives its authority and power from Senate Standing Rule XXV. 
Additionally, Senate Standing Rule XVI further prohibits 
appropriation of funds to programs which were not previously 
authorized. The rules for the House Appropriation committee 
(HAC) are similar to the Senate. :Ref. 2:pp. 11-12J 
BUDGET CONTROL 
The Constitution of the United States gives Congress the 
pO'"ier to allocate the resources of the Federal Government. 
This power gives Congress the authority to enact as "vJell as 
oversee budget execution. Specifically: 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, 
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debt and provide 
for the common defence and general welfare of the United 
States ... to raise and support armies ... to provide and 
maintain a Navy ... to make rules for the government and 
regulation of the land and naval forces ... to provide for 
organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, and for 
governing such part of them as may be et:tployed in the 
Service of the United States. [Ref. 4:pp. 931-932J 
Budgeting goes beyond the allocation of money to federal 
programs and agencies. congressional budget expert Allen 
Schick sees budgeting as a political process used by the 
Government to formulate policy, establish and pursue national 
objectives, promote favorable economic conditions, and respond 
to the demand of citizens and groups [Ref. 5:p. 1]. 
similar view is also held by public policy researcher Aaron 
Wildavsky who believes the budget serves as a mechanism for 
making choices, a statement of goals, and a contract between 
Congress and the El{ecutive to spend appropriated monies for 
autb.orized purposes ~Ref. 6:pp. 1-3]. The power of Congress 
to tal{ and spend allows it to determine policy in many areas, 
make decisions, and control programs. The power over fundi!lg 
also gives congress the ability to exert influer.ce and control 
over the Department of Defense (000) during all phases of the 
military acquisition process. Joseph P. Harris, in his stu;iy, 
<;;9_naressional Control of Administration, summariz8d the 
purpose for congressional control over the 000 budget 3.S 
follow's: 
1. To determine whether legislative policies are being 
faithfully, effectively and efficiently carried out in 
accordance with congressional intent, and to ensure that 
subsequent legislative action may be taken if necessary to 
amend shortcomings of 000 administration of congressional 
directives. 
2. To determine whether legislative programs applicable 
::0 the DOD are achieving their desired goals and 
objectives, and if any additional legislation is required. 
3. To determine if congressional directives are being 
faithfully administered in the public interest, and to 
encourage 000 officials to be diligent in this regard. 
4. To discover instances of fraud, waste, and abuse by 
DoD personnel. 
S. To ensure that management control systems within the 
000 are adequate and effectively employed. 
6. To hold 000 officials accountable to the Congress 
for the use of public funds and other resources available 
for their disposal. [Ref. 7:pp. 1-2] 
Congress el{ercises budgetary control over 000 through 
statutory controls written into the authorization and 
appropriation acts and non-statutory controls such as 
committee reports, floor debates, hearings, and 
testimony. 
D. AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION 
The annual defense authorization and appropriation process 
remains the primary means for r:lembers of Congress to exert 
control over the 000 budget [Ref. 8:p. 64J. Defense 
authorization and appropriation bills are statutory in nature. 
statutory legislation has the binding authority of la',; and 
cannot be modified by 000. The means by which Congress 
provides defense funding is commonly called the "t'.10-ste-:l" 
process [Ref. 9:pp. 60-61J. The first step, authorization, 
must be passed creating or modifying a program. The second 
step, appropriation, prov ides funds for the progra:n. 
AuthoriZation Acts 
An authorization act is substantive legislation 
enacted by Congress that sets up or continues legal 
operation of a federal program or agency either 
indefinitely or for a specific period of time or sanctions 
a particular type of obligation or expenditure within a 
program. Authorizing legislation 1S usually a 
prerequisite for subsequent appropriations or other kinds 
of budget authority to be contained in appropriation acts. 
such legislation may limit the ar:tount of budget authority 
to be provided subsequently or may authorize the 
appropriation of such sums as may be necessary. [Ref. 
6:p. 440] 
2. Appropriation Acts 
An appropriation is an act of Congress that permits 
agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of 
the Treasury for specified purposes. An appropriation act 
is a statute that provides for funds for federal 
programs. An appropriation act generally follows 
enactment of authorizing legislation unless the 
authorizing legislation itself provides the budg(]t 
authority. [Ref.6:p.440] 
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The Armed Services Committees of Congress are responsible 
for authorizing programs and setting funding ceilings fer 
programs. Public law prohibits the appropriation of defense 
funds which have not been authorized by the Armed Services 
committees. Legislation also prohibits expenditure of funds 
in excess of the ceiling in the authorization bill. [Ref. 
9:pp. 60-61J 
In Mission Financing to Realign National Clefense, 
La·,.,rrence R. Jones, of the Naval Postgraduate School, argues 
that Congress shapes defense policy through the authorization 
and appropriation process. Jones states that "the 
authorization process enables Congress to oversee progralT's and 
to legislate policy." [Ref. 10:p. 46J Authorization 
procedures which have evolved for defense related items 
supports his assertion. Practically all 000 programs are 
subjected to annual review to establish authority prior to 
consideration in the appropriation process. According to 
James Lindsay, author of several articles on Congress and the 
defense budget, the Armed services Committees have supported 
the annual authorization process "to reduce the area of 
discretionary power of the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense ... and strengthen legislative control 
prograns." [Ref. II:p. 120] Lindsay argues: 
The [Armed services CommitteesJ traditionally have been 
skeptical of 050, instead favoring the views of the 
individual services. By extending annuaL .. 
authorizations, the Armed Services Committees have been 
12 
able to keep eso under close scrutiny and also have been 
provided opportunities to solicit the advice of the 
professional military. [Ref. l1:p. 376] 
The yearly process of authorizing DoD's programs not only 
exerts congressional influence in defense policy formulation 
and implementation but also allows an individual member to 
draft legislation which benefits his constituents. 
While the Armed Services committees establish programs and 
authorize expenditures in support of those programs, the 
Appropriation Committees in the House and the Senate provide 
the funds to incur obligations. The procedure for providing 
funds is relatively straightforward. To obtain funds for 
authorized programs, an appropriation bill must be passed by 
both Houses of Congress. Appropriated funds cannot exceed the 
authorized ceiling for a program nor can unauthorized programs 
receive funding. 
Jones believes the appropriation process is the single 
most important mechanism for control of the 000 budget because 
it allows Congress to supervise 000 management and financial 
operations and to actively participate in spending decisions 
[Ref. lO:p. 46]. Even though the appropriation procedure is 
straightforward, politics greatly complicate the process. 
Appropriation Committees generally concern themselves with 
more than a simple allocation of funds to 000. One example is 
the restrictive language written into the annual defense 
appropriation acts. Restrictive language typically consists 
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of floors, ceilings, and line program identification and 
funding. An appropriation "floor" represents a minimum level 
below which 000 cannot spend. This type of legislation is 
used by Congress to ensure 000 spends a mandatory amount on a 
given program. 000 must spend the money by the end of the 
fiscal year or report to Congress why they were unable to do 
An appropriation "ceiling" represents a maximum level 
that 000 can spend on an item within an appropriation. 000 
cannot exceed ceilings without approval from Congress. Line 
program identification and funding details specific uses for 
which funds can be spent, or stipulates the amount of funds 
that must be spent on each item. It is the most restrictive 
of all congressional appropriation measures and severely 
limits the discretionary actions of 000. 
Both the Authorization and Appropriation Committees have 
taken a more active role in the formulation of the defense 
budget even though their perspectives are different. The 
Authorization Committees are advocates for their respective 
funding request while the Appropriation Committees see 
themselves as the "guardian of the taxpayer" and pay closer 
attention to details, new programs, and program increases. 
[Ref. 9:p. 86] 
In order to tully understand defense related issues, 
congressional committees depend heavily on their professional 
staff. The need to obtain detailed information on defense 
programs has led to a proliferation of staff. 
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In 1964, the four defense subcommittees on 
appropriations and the Armed Services committees had a 
total of 37 staff members. By 1984, the same committees 
and subcommittees had 60 staff. Five years later the 
number was up to 99. This does not include the 66 
associate staff who work on defense for individual members 
of the same committees, or congressional support agencies. 
From 1960 to 1985, total congressional staff grew by 237% 
and personal staff by 175%. [Ref. 12:p. 20] 
Due to their knowledge about defense issues and programs 
and their influence with congressional committee members, 
professional staff members have become powerful players within 
the authorization and appropriation decision-making process of 
Congress. 
E. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
The Constitution of the United States spreads governing 
power and authority among the three branches of government: 
legislative, judicial, and executive. To ensure no one branch 
becomes predominant, the architects of the Constitution 
designed a system of "checks and balances" into its framework. 
As a result of the safeguards in the Constitution, one of the 
most important roles of Congress is that of oVersight. 
Webster's dictionary defines "oversight" as the watchful 
care, management, or supervision of an activity [Ref. 13:p. 
840]. Congress has the right and responsibility to oversee 
operations in the Executive Branch to ensure funds are 
properly used and laws followed. Article I, section 8 of the 
Constitution provides the Congress with authority to legislate 
15 
laws considered necessary to ensure that the provis ions of the 
Constitution are properly executed. specifically: 
[ The Congress shall have the powerJ to make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers 
vested by this constitution in the Government of the 
united states. [ Ref. 4:p. 932J 
Article I, Sect ion 9 of the Constitution requ i r e s strict 
accountabili ty over the use of public funds and provides power 
to Congress to require subm i ssion of periodic reports to 
that pUblic funds responsib ly ut ilized. 
Specifically: 
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
consequence of Appropriations made by law, and a regular 
statement and account of receipts and expenditures of all 
public money shall be published from time to time. [Ref. 
4:p. 932 J 
These two sections of the constitution mandate Congress to 
observe the performance of the Executi ve Branch to ensure 
public funds are spent wi sely. effectively. and within their 
intended purposes. 
The Legislative Reorganization Act directs all 
congressional committees to exercise oversight of agencies and 
programs in their jurisdiction. Section 136 states: 
... to assist the Congress in appraising the 
administration of laws and in developing such amendments 
or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each 
standing committee of the Senate and House of 
representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of 
the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of 
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any laws, the subject matter of which is within the 
jurisdiction of such committee; and for that purpose, 
shall study all reports and data submitted to the Congress 
by the agencies in the Executive Branch of Government. 
[Ref. 14:p. 94] 
Primary responsibility for overseeing 000 execution of the 
budget lies with the defense committees which regularly hold 
hearings on defense issues, namely, The Armed Services 
Committees and Defense Appropriation Subcommittees of 
Congress. 
The function of oversight is not unique to the Legislative 
Branch of Government. As noted by J. Ronald Fox, author of 
Defense Management Challenge: 
Each of the participants in the acquisition process [The 
Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Service 
secretary, the service headquarters, the military service 
material commands and indUstry] exercises an oVersight 
responsibility to ensure the laws and regulations are 
observed and programs pursued efficiently. Consequently, 
there are numerous oversight and monitoring agencies. The 
Executive Branch has the Justice Department and the Office 
of Management and Budget; the Department of Defense and 
each military service has an independent inspector general 
and auditing office; and Congress uses the General 
Accounting Office for program audits and assessments, the 
congressional Budget Office for budget and progrartl cost 
estimates, and the Congressional Research service and 
Office of technology Assessment for analyses. Industry 
has its legal resources, washington representatives, and 
industry associations to protect its interests. [Ref. 
15:pp. 18-19J 
congressional committees and subcommittees overseeing 000 
use several means of gathering information. Several of these 
mechanisms for conducting oversight are discussed below. 
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1. congressional Budget Office 
The Congressional Budget Office (CeO) is the 
legislative counterpart of the Office of Management and 
Budget. Created by the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
1974, the CBO supports the budget process by providing 
independent economic and program analysis and cost information 
on Executive Branch budget proposals. In addition to its 
primary responsibilities, the CSO also conducts special 
studies and analysis of defense issues at the direction of the 
congressional oversight committees. [Ref. l5:p. 257] 
2. General Accounting office 
One of the agencies used by Congress to conduct 
oversight of 000 is the General ACCounting Office (GAO). 
Established by the Budget Act of 1921, the GAO is the chief 
audit agency for Congress. It has the power to investigate, 
survey, or review program implementation and execution. 
Investigations are one of the most powerful tools used 
by Congress. According to Jones, investigations serve three 
purposes relatiVe to control of the 000 budget: 
1. Investigations assist Congress in ensuring that the 
000 is efficient in expenditure of public funds giVen the 
discretionary authority granted to the DoD for proqra:m 
execution. 
2. Investigations inform. the general public about the 
conduct of DoD officials and their administration of 
programs. 
J. l.nvestigations provide infonation needed by 
Congress to make decisions on defense and national 
security matters. [Ref. lO:p. 80] 
,. 
Surveys and reviews of DoD programs are also conducted 
by GAO. A survey is a relatively short-term look into a 
program to see if a full review is warranted, whereas, a 
review is a comprehensive study of the program. [Ref. 9:p. 
113J 
3. Selected Acquisition Report 
The Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) is 
comprehensive, summary status report on major defense 
acquisition programs that exceed $200 million in yearly 
research and development funds, cost over $1 billion in yearly 
procurement, or have significant interest to Congress [Ref. 
9:p. 125]. 
The SAR provides key cost, schedule, and performance 
information to Congress on the status of a program. This 
information is used by Congress to compare current estimates 
with earlier planning, development, or production estimates. 
The SAR is submitted annually, as of December 31, to 
Congress. Quarterly submissions are required on an exception 
basis when: there has been a 15 percent or more increase in 
program acquisition unit cost; total program cost change by 
more than five percent; a six month or greater delay to 
current estimates of any scheduled milestone occurs; or any 
correction is made at cost variance calculations. [Ref. 9:p. 
125] 
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... Congres8ional Data Sheet 
Because it is impossible to discuss every 000 program 
during budget hearings, a congressional Data Sheet (CDS) is 
prepared for each major weapon system requiring authorization. 
The CDS is used by congressional staffs to review the 
procurement programs proposed by the 000. Information 
submitted within the CDS includes: a narrative description, 
mission, cost data and basis for the requirement; 
characteristics and contract data, indicating contractor and 
award data; historical cost comparison by appropriation; 
inventory assets and future production deliveries; Test and 
Evaluation data; and flight simulator data, where appropriate. 
[Ref. 9:p. 124] 
5. Research and Development Descriptive Summaries 
The Research and Development Descriptive Summary 
(RODS) is one of the most important documents submitted to 
Congress for program justification. It provides detailed 
justification of each item in the Research, Development, Test 
and EvalUation (RDT&E) account, and summarizes the scope and 
anticipated results of each program. Information included 
within the RDDS includes: program purpose; program status; 
mission contribution; and projected funds used. [Ref. 9:pp. 
122-123 ] 
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congressional Resa.rch Service and office of Technical 
Assess.ant 
Two other sources available to Congress to obtain 
information are the Congressional Research service (CRS) and 
the Office of Technical Assessment (OTA). The CRS provides a 
variety of support services to Congress to include: 
information seminars for members and staff; analysis of 
issues; maintenance of automated data bases; preparation of 
digests and bill summaries; fUrnishing questions for committee 
hearings; policy analysis; and compilation of statistical 
information [Ref. 16:pp. 255-256]. The OTA was created in 
1974 to assist Congress evaluate complex technical issues. 
7. unit cost Report 
The Unit Cost Report (UCR) is submitted by the Service 
Secretaries to Congress. The purpose of the report is to 
highlight significant cost growth early enough so that 
Congress can take remedial action. The UCR is submitted to 
Congress within 30 days for programs which: the program 
acquisition unit cost (PAUC) is more than 15 percent above the 
baseline SAR estimate; the current unit procurement cost 
(CPUC) is more than 15 percent above the baseline SAR 
estimate: or cost or schedule variance of a major contract 
have resulted in an increase in the cost of the contract of at 
least 15 percent over the initial cost of the contract. [Ref. 
17:p. 18-3] 
2l 
If the unit cost growth exceeds the baseline by 25 
percent or more, the Secretary of Defense must certify to 
Congress within 30 days that the program is still required and 
no alternative exits; the program is essential to national 
defense; and the management structure is adequate to manage 
and control unit cost. [Ref. l7:p. 18-7] 
8. Contract Award Report 
Prior to awarding a contract or executing an option on 
any weapon system contract, 000 is required to notify Congress 
via the Contract Award Report. Notification to Congress 
allows members with constituent interest the latitude of 
benefiting politically from the procurement actions. 
F. IXPACT OF OVERSIGHT 
There has been both a positive and negative impact on 
defense acquisition resulting from congressional oversight. 
In his book, pepartment of pefense Systems Acquisition 
Management: congressional Criticism and Concerns, John Bennett 
highlights four major contributions of congressional 
oversight. These include: [Ref. 18!pp. 209-210] 
1. Exposing .... eaknesses of 000 business management. 
2. Raising public and government interest in major 
systems acquisition policy. 
3. Making 000 conscious of costs. 
4. Justifying reductions in defense spending. 
The conduct of congressional oversight, however, has its 
faults. In this regard, line-item budget reviews present the 
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impression Congress does not trust the DoD in the allocation 
of defense budget dollars. Selected reports to Congress, such 
as the SAR and UCR are time consuming to complete, yet, are 
not considered as useful decision documents or management 
tools by the recipients [Ref. 19:p. 44J. Additionally, 
Congress is limited in its ability to probe deeply into 
problems due to competing priorities and limited resources. 
G. CONGRESSIONAL HO'l'IVA'l'IOH 
To a large degree, members of Congress become involved in 
the oversight process depending on what motivates them. 
congressional members are subject to influence by numerous 
sources, including constituents, the Executive Branch, media, 
special interest groups, and industry. In The Politics of 
Weapons Procurement: The Role of Congress, the authors, Liske 
and Rundquist, believe the behavior of elected officials is 
driven by the capacity in which he or she is serving. These 
capacities are constituency, career, agency, and institution. 
[Ref. 20:p. 4] 
A basic tenant of the Constitution is that members of 
Congress are elected to represent the interest of their 
constituents. Therefore, it is no surprise that constituent 
serving behavior is driven by the desire of members to address 
the political and economic interest of the voters back in 
there home states and districts. The political process of 
23 
using federal programs to benefit constituents is referred to 
as "pork barrel" politics. 
The desire to take care of parochial interest is often 
seen in the enactment of defense related legislation. 
Classical treatment of "pork barrel" legislation begins with 
a legislative strategy of tailoring program proposals to meet 
the needs of a particular clientele and earmarking funds to 
the program [Ref. 6:p. 101]. The Executive agencies respond 
by designing programs to spread spending throughout as many 
key districts as possible. The goal is to gather as much 
legislative support as necessary to assure continued funding 
for the program. 
Pork barrel legislation is seen by some members of 
Congress as wasteful and harmful to national interest. 
political interests in Congress are often the cause of 
military misspending. For purely political reasons, 
Congress will sometimes direct the armed forces to buy a 
weapon or keep a base open even when military planners 
strenuously object. It has been estimated that $5 billion 
could be cut from the defense budget if legislators 
stopped seeking unjustifiable outlays for the benefit of 
their own districts and states. [Ref. 10:p. 95] 
Other members of Congress have expressed an opposite 
viewpoint, accepting "pork barrel" politics as a natural 
extension of their constitutional responsibility of 
representation. Statements from members of Congress support 
this view: 
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[Eagleton (D-MO)]: I'm from greater St.Louis, and I know 
how the economy in the area would atrophy if McDonnell 
weren't there. So that's bound to influence my thinking. 
I confess to being biased. [Ref. lO:p. 96] 
[Downey (D-NY)]: When the A-6 Intruder [GrUll\Jllan] was going 
to be killed, I'm the Congressman from that district and 
I'm on the Armed services committee. It's my job, whether 
I think the A-6 is good or not, to support it. [Ref. lO:p. 
96J 
Regardless of their public views on the topic, most 
members of Congress participate in some form of "pork barrel" 
politics because it impacts the next category of behavior, 
career serving. 
Career serving behavior is motivated by a member's 
personal goals, desires, and ambitions. Members of Congress 
can help their careers by serving their constituents, doing 
favors for influential people, supporting their political 
party, and tending the needs of special POlitical interest 
groups. Favors are normally returned in the form of campaign 
contributions, access to information, or reelection support. 
Career serving behavior is one of the most powerful influences 
on congressional decision-making. 
Agency serving behavior is driven by a member's legitimate 
concern over the efficient and effective functioning of 
governmental agencies. In this framework, a member's 
perception of the Executive Branch is very important. If the 
000 acquisition process, for example, is perceived as weak and 
inefficient, a member exhibiting this type of behavior would 
most likely seek increased OVersight of the acquisition 
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process or call for acquisition reform. The welfare of the 
nation and support of national policy objectives are the top 
motivator in this category. 
Institution serving behavior is similar to agency serving 
except the member's behavior is motivated by his desire to 
influence a legislative agenda. 
The constitution of the United states establishes mandates 
for the control of the 000 budget. Chapter two detailed some 
of the controls used by Congress to regulate defense 
acquisition. These were broadly defined into two categories: 
budget formulation through the authorization and appropriation 
process, and budget execution oversight through activities 
such as investigation and reports. 
The Defense Committees of Congress are key players in the 
authorization and appropriation process and oversight 
function. committee members depend heavily on their 
professional staffs to gather and analyze information for 
decision-making. At their disposal are a variety of methods 
to conduct oversight including the GAO, CSO, and mandatory 
reports from 000. 
In the area of motivation, two key points were made. 
First, members of Congress are very opportunistic in advancing 
their own agendas in budget negotiation and oversight. Second, 
decisions made by members of Congress are often a reflection 
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of the capacity in which they are serving: constituency, 
career, agency, or institution. 
III. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
THE ACQUISITION PROCESS 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-109, 
published in 1976, outlines policy and guidance for the 
acquisition of major weapon systems. Its primary purpose is 
"to assure the effectiveness and efficiency of the process of 
acquiring major weapon systems." [Ref. 21:p. J] In order to 
achieve its goal of increasing effectiveness in major systems 
acquisition, several program management objectives are listed . 
These include: 
1. Ensure that each major system: Fulfills a mission 
needs; operates effectively in its intended environment; 
demonstrates a level of performance and reliabilit.y that 
justifies the allocation of the nation's limited resources 
for its acquisition and ownership. 
2. Depend on, whenever economically benef icial, 
competition between similar or differing system design 
concepts throughout the entire acquisition process. 
3. Ensure appropriate trade-off among investment costs, 
ownership costs, schedules, and performance 
characteristics. 
<I. Provide strong checks and balances by ensuring 
adequate system test and evaluation. Conduct such tests 
and evaluation independently I where practical, of 
developer and user. 
s . Accomplish system acquisition planning, built on 
analysis of agency missions, which implies appropriate 
resource allocation resulting from clear artiCUlation of 
agency mission needs. 
6. Tailor an acquisition strategy for each program as 
soon as the agency decides to solicit alternative system 
desit;ln concepts that could lead to the acquisition of a 
new major system and refine the strategy as the program 
proceeds through the acquisition process. 
7. Maintain a capacity to: Predict, review, assess, 
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lhe principal implementation guidance for defense systems 
acquisition is Depar':ment of Defense Directive (000::1) 5000.1, 
"Defense Acquisition" and Department of Defense Tnstruction 
(ucu!) 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Managenent l'olicie5 
Procedures". DoDD 5000.1 LJ'lple:nents ':he concepts of 0l~I3 
ci rcular A-l0'J and at,:empts to forge an interface anong tl'.E'-
three decision-making support systems: requi rements 
generation, acqu:'sition management, and planning, prograrr,ming, 
",nd budgeting (PPBS). 
The major system acquisition process can be vie'ded as a 
sequence of program activity phases and decision events 
directed towards the accompl ishment of program obj ecti ves. 
The acquisition process for major systems, as outlined in 0001 
5000.2, begins with a mission need and progresses thrcugh f::'ve 
phases: Concept Exploration and Definition (Phase 0), 
Demonstration and Validation (Phase I), Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (Phase II), Production and 
Deployment (Phases III) and Operations and Support (Phase IV). 
[Ref. 22:pp. 3-4J 
Before the start of each phase in the system acquisition 
process, the need for the system is reviewed. Following the 
review, a decision is made to continue, modify, or discontinue 
29 
the program. During the acquisition process, five milestone 
decision reviews are conducted: Concept Studies Approval 
(Milestone 0), Concept Demonstration Approval (Milestone I), 
Development Approval (Milestone II), Production Approval 
(Milestone III) and Major Modification Approval (Milestone 
IV). [Ref. 22:pp. 3-4J 
Determination of Mission Need 
An acguisition program is based on an identified 
:nission need. A mission need seeks to establish a new 
operational capability, improve an existing capability, or 
correct a warfighting deficiency. Mission needs are evaluated 
to deten:tine if they can be satisfied by changes in doctrine, 
operational concepts, tactics, training or organization. If 
the mission need cannot be satisfied by these alternatives, a 
Mission Need Statement is prepared and submitted through the 
acquisition chain of command for approval. [Ref. 22:p. 3-2] 
2. Concept Studies Approval (Milestone 0 I 
The first key decision event, Concept Studies 
Approval, occurs when the milestone decision authority 
determines what action shOUld be taken on the Mission Needs 
Statement. The milestone decision authority may be either the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology 
(USD(A&T)), or the appropriate individual within the Services 
depending an the acquisition category of the proposed major 
system. For those Mission Need statements receiving favorable 
consideration, the milestone decision authority issues an 
Acquisition Decision Me~orandum specifying a minimum set of 
alternative concepts to be examined, the lead organization, 
and the exit criteria. Approval of Concept Studies signals 
permission to enter the Concept Exploration and Definition 
phase of the life-cycle but does not establish a new progra~. 
::<ef. 22:p. 3-4] 
3. Concept Exploration and Defini tion (Phase 0) 
During the Concept Exploration and Definition phase 
coth the developer and user are heavily involved. Studies of 
alternative concepts solicited from industry, 
universities, and research and development centers. The user 
of the proposed syste;n continues to refine the operational 
performance para;neters and minimum acceptable operational 
requirements. The objectives of this phase, according to 0001 
1. Explore various material alternatives to satisfying 
the documented mission need. 
2. Define the most promising system concept(s). 
J. Develop supporting analysis and information to 
include identifying high risk areas and risk management 
approaches. 
4. Develop a proposed acquisition strategy and initial 
program objectives for cost, schedule, and performance for 
the most promising system concept{s). [Ref. 22:p. 3-8] 
4. Concept Demonstration Approval (Milestone I) 
The Concept Exploration and Definition phase 
terminates in a milestone decision review. This review, 
concept Demonstration Approval, evaluates the feasibility and 
affordability of establishing a new acquisition program. A 
favorable decision at Milestone I initiates a new acquisition 
program; establishes a Concept Baseline containing initial 
program cost, schedule, and performance obj ecti ves; and 
authorizes entry into the next phase of the acquisition 
process. [Ref. 22:p. 3-10] 
5. Demonstration and Validation (Phase I) 
During the Demonstration and Validation phase cY.lphasis 
on validating the approved design concepts and selecting 
the system which is most capable of satisfying the mission 
need. The objectives of this phase, according to the DeDI 
5000.2, are to: 
1. Better define the critical design characteristics 
and expected capabilities of the system concept(s). 
2. Demonstrate that the technologies critical to the 
most promising concept(s) can be incorporated into system 
design(s) with confidence. 
3. Prove that the processes critical to the most 
promising system concept(s) are understood and attainable. 
4. Develop the analyses/information needed to sc:pport 
a Milestone II decision. 
5. Establish a proposed Development Baseline containing 
refined program cost, schedule, and performance objectives 
for the most promising design approach. [Ret. 22:p. 3-4J 
6. Development Approval (Milestone II) 
According to 0001 5000.2, the Milestone II objectives 
are to: 
1. Determine if the results of phase I, Demonstration 
and Validation, warrant continuation. 
:2. Establish a Development Baseline containing refined 
program cost, schedule, and performance objectives for a 
program approved for continuation. [Ref. :2:2:p. 3-18] 
Development approval typically involves a commitment to 10101-
rate initial production. Low-rate initial production 
quantities must be identified by the milestone decision 
authority for major acquisition programs. 
7. Engineering and Manuracturinq Development {Phase III 
The primary goals of Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development are to gain production approval and to prepare for 
full-scale production Of the system which best meets mission 
needs and program objectives. During this phase, the most 
promising concept selected is refined and developed into a 
stable, producible, affordable system. Representative systems 
manufactured during this phase are also used to conduct both 
development and operational testing. Development testing 
measures system performance against contract specifications. 
operational testing measures system performance against the 
user's minimum operational performance. Low-rate initial 
production of the system verifies the adequacy of the 
production process and provides a realistic estimate of 
production costs. [Ref. 22:p. 3-20J 
8. Production Approval (Milestone IIIl 
The Milestone III review, Production Approval, 
addresses the results of operational testing; production and 
deployment schedules; production cost verification; 
J3 
affordability and life-cycle costi and plans for integrated 
logistics SUpport. It is the most important of all decision 
reviews because a favorable decision at this point represents 
a huge financial and resource commitment to build, deploy, and 
support the system. Once approved, a Production Baseline is 
established containing refined cost, schedule and performance 
objectives for the program. [Ref. 22:p. 3-20] 
9. Production and Deployment (Phase III) 
The primary goal of the Production and Deployment 
phase is to produce and deliver an effective, fully supported 
system at the lowest cost. Key objectives in this phase of 
the system life cycle, according to DODI 5000.2, are to: 
1. Establish a stable, efficient production and support 
base. 
2. Achieve an operational capability that satisfies the 
mission need. 
3. Conduct follow-on operational and production 
verification testing to confirm and monitor performance 
and qUality. [Ref. 22:p. 3-27] 
Depending on the production baseline, this phase of the system 
cycle may last several years. 
10. operatioDs and support (Phase IV) 
Logistics support is a vital element in the success of 
any aCqUisition program. Because of this, the operations and 
Support phase begins with initial system fielding and overlaps 
the Production and Deployment phase. The objectives of the 
Program Manager during this phase are to ensure the fielded 
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system continues to provide the capabilities required to meet 
the identified mission need and to identify shortcomings or 
deficiencies that must be corrected to improve performance. 
B. KAJOR MODIFICA'l'ION (MILl!IS'l'ONB IV) 
A large portion of the DoD budget is used to modify 
existing systems. Major systems are modified to correct 
system deficiencies discovered during operational use; to 
increase system performance I and to counter an emerging 
threat. The underlying theme with all modification is that 
they extend the system's useful life and offer a cost-
effective alternative to new weapon procurement. 
Most major system modifications result from a Milestone 
IV, "Major Modification Approval," review by the decision 
authority. The primary purpose of the review is to determine 
if a major upgrade to the system currently in production is 
warranted. Different procedures are followed for weapon 
systems no longer in production. DoDI 5000.2 states, 
When a system is no longer in production, a deficiency 
resulting from a change in threat; defense policy, or 
technology must be defined in a new Mission Need 
statement. The intent is that potential system 
modifications should compete with all other possible 
alternatives during a new phase 0, Concept Exploration and 
Definition. [Ref. 22:p. 3-29) 
If a major modification program is approved for a system still 
in production, the milestone decision authority will determine 
the acquisition phase to be entered. This decision will be 
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based on the amount of resources committed and the level of 
risk. 
The amount of money allotted to some modifications can be 
significant. The total program cost of the F-14D upgrade, for 
example, exceeded one billion dollars annually on several 
occasions [Ref. 23:p. 13]. When system modifications are 
very large, they are budgeted and funded as if they were new 
development efforts. 
Planning for a modification is similar to new system 
development. The Program Manager establishes an acquisition 
strategy and baseline for the modification program. Together, 
these two items provide a framework for managing the program 
and serves as a guide in reducing risk. 
c. DBFBMSB ACQtJISI'l'IOil BOARD 
The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the primary forum 
of decision-making within the Department of Defense (000) for 
acquisition programs. The DAB conducts management of major 
defense acquisition programs as they proceed from requirement 
and concept definition through production and deploYlllent. The 
DAB is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition & Technology (USD(A&T». who also serves as the 
milestone decision authority for major defense programs. 
Other key members of the DAB include the Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering; the Assistant secretary of Defense for Program 
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Analysis and Evaluation; and the Component Acquisitior. 
Executives. [Ref. 24:pp. 1-4J 
Formal DAB reviews are conducted at each milestone to 
assess progra::n accomplishments during the previous life-cycle 
phase and to assess readiness to proceed to the next phase. 
According to Joseph Schmoll, author of Introduction To :Jefe'~se 
Acquisition Manacement, typical issues addressed in CAB 
proceedings include, "cost growth, schedule delays, technical 
threshold breaches, supportability issues, acquisition 
strategy, threat assessment, test and evaluation highlights, 
cooperative develop:nent/joint service concerns, manpower 
eva 1 uation, and operational effectiveness/sui tabil i ty." [Ref. 
25:p.19J At the conclusion of the DAB review, the (CSD(A&T)) 
issues his decisions and guidance through the Acquisition 
Decision Memorandum (ADM). 
The decision-making role of the DAB is not limited to 
milestone decision reviews. In support of its oversight 
functions and management responsibilities for the DoD 
Acquisition System, the DAB also: 
1. Makes recommendations to the Defense Acquisition 
Executive (DAE) on DoD acquisition policies. 
2. Promotes coordination, cooperation, and mutual 
understanding of matters related to the DoD Acquisition 
System, particularly those involving cross-service and 
Allied management of joint programs, within DoD and 
between 000 and other Federal Agencies, and with 
cooperative Programs with Allied Nations. 
3. Recommends procedures that implement policy 
initiatives which streamline and improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the 000 Acquisition System. 
4. Develops recommendations regarding alternative near-
term and long-term acquisition strategies, plans, and 
resource levels. 
5. Identifies issues and concerns and develops 
recoID.."nendations regarding acquisition policy and guidance 
matters. 
6 Identifies issues for study and analysis by the 
appropriate Acquisition committees of the DAB. [Ref. 2" :pp. 1-2] 
D. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM 
Knowledge of how DoD allocates resources is essential to 
understanding the defense acquisition process. The reSCl: :"ce 
nanagement system in use by DoD was first introduced, in 1961, 
by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Since that 
time, it has remained relatively unchanged and is known as the 
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). 
The PPBS is a decision-making process for allocating 
resources anong a number of competing programs or alternu.tives 
which support national strategy. The ultimate objective :Jf 
PPBS is to provide operational commanders with the best mix elf 
forces, equipment, and support attainable within fisci'll 
constraints. To achieve this objective, PPBS is broken into 
three distinct but interrelated phases: planning, programming, 
and budgeting. [Ref. 25:p. 30J 
1. Planning 
Planning, the first phase of PPBS, beg ins with the 
collection and evaluation of strategic intelligence concerning 
military capabilities and political intentions of foreign 
nations. Once the overall threat to the security of the 
united States and its vital interest has been evaluated, broad 
strategies for dealing with the threats and the force levels 
supporting those strategies are developed. The Under 
secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P» is responsible during 
this phase for integrating defense-wide policies with respect 
to manpower, logistics, and acquisition. [Ref. 26: p. C13] 
The key document resulting from the planning process 
is the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG provides 
force and fiscal guidance to the Services necessary to 
construct their respective program proposals and ultimately, 
their budgets. The DPG includes an assessment of the threat 
to u.s. interest; a statement of U.S. defense policy and 
strategy; a general assessment of military requirements for 
defending the national interests; and an assessment of the 
material and financial resources available for defense 
programs in the future. Once approved by the SECDEF, the DPG 
becomes the basis for the programming phase. [Ref. 26:p. Cl5) 
2 • ProqramJllinq 
Programming, the second phase of PPBS, begins with 
receipt of the DPG. During this phase, each military service 
constructs a detailed list of proposed programs in terms of 
forces, personnel, materials, and dollars to satisfy the 
strategic requirements specified in the DPG. These program 
proposal cover a six year period and are submitted in the form 
of Program Objective Memoranda (POMs). The POM then becomes 
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the service's request for resources to accomplish its mission. 
[Ref. 26:p. C17-C27] 
Once the POM completes service review, it is forwarded 
to the Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB). The DPRB 
is a high level DOD group that assists the SECDEF in managing 
the PPBS. Key members include: the Under Secretaries of 
Defense for Acquisition & Technology (USD(A&T») and Policy 
(USD(P», the 000 Comptroller, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the Director 
of Defense Research and Engineering [Ref. 25:p. 16]. The 
DPRB's decisions regarding Service programs are submitted to 
the SECDEF for approval. After the SECDEF makes the final POM 
decisions, they are recorded in Program Decision Memoranda 
(PDM) . The PDM approves the POM with specific changes and 
becomes the basis for Budget Estimate Submission (BES). 
Issuance of the PDM to each Service is the last step in the 
programming phase. 
3. Budgetinq 
Budgeting is the third and final phase of the PPBS 
cycle. Its purpose is to translate planning and programming 
guidance into annual funding requirements. 
The defense budget is prepared by the Office of the 
secretary of Defense (050) for inclusion into the President's 
Budget. The process begins when the SECDEF receives budget 
estimates from the Services. Hearings are held jointly with 
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the Services, OSD, and OMS to determine the adequacy of the 
estimates and to identify less costly alternatives where 
possible. The results of the SECDEF budget hearing on the 
DoD Component budget requests are issued in a Program Budget 
Decision. After Service appeals have been addressed, the 000 
budget request is submitted to OMB for incorporation into the 
President's Budget. [Ref. 26:pp. C28-C30] 
E. ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
The Program Manager is required by 000 policy to develop 
a comprehensive framework for planning and managing an 
acquisition program. This framework, the acquisition strategy 
is defined as "a business and technical management approach 
designed to achieve program objectives within resource 
constraints imposed." [Ref. 27:p. B-3J The acquisition 
strategy covers the entire life cycle of the system and is 
tailored to fit the needs for developing, producing, and 
fielding the system. In order to develop a successful 
acquisition strategy, DoDI 5000.2 outlines several important 
guidelines: 
1. An acquisition strategy should minimize the time and 
cost of satisfying an identified, validated need. 
2. The acquisition strategy will be tailored to match 
the character of the program and allow the most efficient 
satisfaction of individual program requirements, 
consistent with the degree of risk involved. 
3. The acquisition strategy should be developed in 
sufficient detail to establish the management approach 
that will be used to direct and control all elements of a 
program. 
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4. The strategy should be developed in sufficient 
detail to establish the managerial approach that will be 
used to direct and control all elements of the acquisition 
to achieve program objectives. 
5. The strategy will be kept current and formally 
updated at each milestone decision point as the system 
approach and program elements are better defined. [Ref. 
22:p. 5-A-l] 
A well-structured acquisition strategy allows the program 
manager to control the key variables of cost, weapon system 
performance, schedule, and supportability. It also serves as 
a long range Planning guide for program execution and as a 
management tool for the Program Manager. captain Bruce 
Bisset, USMC, in his thesis entitled "Acquisition Strategy 
Development at Program Initiation: Concepts, Realities, and 
Methodology," listed several constraints and limitations which 
shape the formUlation and execution of the acquiSition 
strategy. Key among these are: 
1. Economic Pressures - The high price of weapon 
systems has increased pressures to hold down program 
costs. 
2. Political Pressures - political concerns from both 
the Legislative and Executive Branches of Government have 
forced the program manager to consider the ramifications 
of each strategy option as well as the likelihood of its 
acceptance. 
3. Resource Limitations - As the budget continues to 
decrease, there will be increased competition for limited 
resources. The program manager must pay close attention 
to the status of program funding because a reduction 
normally leads to a reduction of planned efforts and the 
rescheduling of tasks for a later date. 
4. Schedule Requirements - There is constant pressure 
to reduce the time it takes to acquire and field a weapon 
system. Whenever scheduling requirements dominate, the 
choice of acquisition strategies available to the program 
manager is reduced resulting in poor management of the 
program. [Ref, 28:pp. 36-38] 
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Even though 0001 5000.2 emphasizes the acquisition 
strategy must be tailored to fit the unique aspects of the 
program, often the program manager is limited in his 
formulation by these economic, technical, and political 
factors. 
Some of the tools and techniques available to the Program 
Manager to control the key variables of cost, schedule, 
perfOrTIance, and supportability are discussed below. Theso 
are integrated into the acquisition strategy and beeone a:l 
integral part of the strategy on which the success or fail",lre 
of the progran is judged. 
1. Concurrency 
Concurrency is a scheduling strategy ',;hieh combines or 
overlaps design, testing, production and deployment 
activities. Its principal objective is to shorten the overall 
delivery schedule so that the user can obtain an earlier 
operational capability. Use of concurrency by the program 
manager as part of his acquisition strategy increases progran 
risk. If the technology is advanced and the system is 
complex, cost growth, schedule slippage, and performance 
shortfalls are likely to occur if difficulties arise during 
production. since concurrency does entail a SUbstantial risk, 
the Program Manager must evaluate the trade-off of earlier 
capability with the potential cost, schedule, and performance 
difficulties which could occur. 
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2. Acquisition streamlining 
Acquisition streamlining seeks to reduce the cost and 
time it takes to acquire a weapon system while still 
maintaining or improving the quality of the product. As 
defined by 0000 5000.2, 
Acquisition streamlining is any effort that results ln 
tlore efficient and effective use of resources to develop 
or produce quality systems. This includes ensuring that 
only necessary and cost-effective requi rements are 
included.... [Ref. 22:p. 15-2J 
Streamlining requires e:.ctraordinary cooperation and team' .. ork 
between the Government and the contractor to eliminate non-
essential requirements from the contract. This can be 
accomplished in several ways: 
1. State requirements in terms of performance rather 
than design. 
2. Use non-developmental items wherever possible. 
J. Involve industry early in the acquiSition effort to 
take advantage of industry expertise to improve the 
acquisition strategy. 
4. Eliminate all non-essential data requirements. 
5. Do not apply design solutions, specifications, and 
standards prematurely. [Ref. 22:p. 10-C-1J 
Program Managers and contractors can also apply tr.e 
streamlining concept to test planning and logistic support 
analysis. streamlining in these two areas are particularly 
well-suited for weapon system modifications or upgrades due to 
the lower technical risks inVOlved. 
3. Preplanned Product Improvement (P3I) 
Traditionally, most major system improvements ar.d 
modifications have been revolutionary nature. 
Revolutionary development begins with a product improvements 
idea. The idea is then developed, verified, tested, produced, 
and finally applied to the systeD. This costly, time-
consuICling nethod tor improving a system normally averages five 
years for najor systems. [Ref. 22:p. 5-A-5] 
In 1981, the Acquisition Improve:nent Program mandated 
the use of a new acquisition strategy, P3I, to reduce program 
c~ost and schedule. 0001 5000.2 defines P3I as an evolutionary 
acquisition concept. Its objective is to allo',; fieldir.g of a 
new system using mature technology while planning and 
configuring for incremental improvements to the system. 
Preplanned product improvements allow a system to be produced 
which is capable of meeting the current threat while planning 
for incorporation of emerging technologies after the system is 
deployed. ~Ref. 22:p. 5-A-5] 
In addition to extending a weapon system's useful 
life and reducing the need for replacenent systems, P3I also 
has several other advantages. These include: 
1. Earlier initial operational capability date for the 
baseline system. 
2. Reduced overall acquisition, operating, and support 
cost. 
3. Reduced technical, cost, and schedule risk. 
Enhanced operational capability for the "final" 
system. 
Responsiveness to threat changes and future 
technology development. [Ref. 29:p. 4.2-1: 
Even though P31 offers many advantages, implementation 
of a P31 strategy does have several inherent risks. From a 
budgetary viewpoint, the implementing Service, 000, and 
Congress must demonstrate a commitment to acquiring the system 
under the P31 concept. This includes accepting higher initial 
costs to obtain growth potential for future exploitation. 
Additionally, research, development, testing and evaluation 
funding must continue to flow intc the program office in order 
to pursue development of deferred performance imprOVements. 
Lack of funding support after prod'.Iction and fielding of the 
basic system leaves the program vulnerable to "gcld plating" 
criticism. 
The term preplan ned product improvement is often 
confused with product improvement. Preplanned product 
improvement differs from product improvement in that it is 
planned growth. The need for eventual modification is 
recognized during the early development stages, and the 
acquisition strategy is designed to include provisions for 
ensuring that these modifications can be effectively 
introduced. Product improvements, on the opposi te spectrum, 
are unplanned and normally not seen in the acquisition 
strategy. Product improvement is applied when a system is in 
the field and modifications must be incorporated to overcame 
problems. These changes normally include reliability, 
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availability, and maintainability (RAM) improvements i 
standardization interoperability upgrades; and safety 
modifications. [Ref. l:p. 16-2] 
operationally, the decision to use PJI should be made 
early as possible by the Program Manager. An early 
decision gives the contractor the opportunity to design the 
baseline system so that subsystems can easily be broken out 
for development and replacement. Poor baseline design which 
does not take into account future system growth requirements 
cause retrofit and modifications to become both costly and 
timely . 
.f,. standardization 
Standardization is "the process by which the 
Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable 
cooperation among the Services and Defense agencies for the 
most efficient use of research, development, and production 
resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis 
the use of common or compatible components, supplies, or 
equipment." [Ref. 27:p. 8-104] 
Standardization is normally associated with technical 
risks. Technical risks are minimized by using components or 
systems that are in wide use and have established performance 
and reliability histories. Additionally, commonality allows 
the weapon system to benefit from development efforts which 
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are already underway or which has been completed by other 
programs. 
5. COllpetition 
Another policy which influences the activities of a 
Program Manager when developing and implementing his 
acquisition strategy is DoD's policy regarding competition. 
0001 5000.2 requires the Program Manager to describe plans to 
develop a competitive environment in all phases of the 
acquisition strategy [Ref. 22:p. 5-A-2]. The basic 
assumption behind competition is that it leads to a higher 
quality product at a lower cost. 
Even though the benefits of competition are well 
recognized, there are instances when competition is not 
practical. This is normally the case in major system 
modifications because one company is usually the sale 
developer and manufacturer. When this occurs, the cost to the 
Government of developing a new source of manufacturing or 
acquiring a competitive level data package is often 
prohibitive. 
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IV. THE F-14 UPGRADE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The F-14 is an all-weather, carrier-based, aircraft 
capable of performing air superiority, fleet air defense, and 
air-to-ground missions. The original version was the F-14A, 
a variable sweep wing, supersonic fighter with vast targeting 
and engagement capabilities. It featured the AWG-9 weapon 
control system which was capable of tracking and shooting at 
multiple targets in a heavy electronic counter-measure (ECM) 
env ironment. The F-14A was powered by two Pratt &- Whitney 
TF-30-P-412 turbofan engines originally designed for the F-
l11B program. 
In 1984, the first major system upgrade to the Grumman 
F-14 began. The F-14D was designed to be a tremendous 
improvement over the original F-14A. Its engines, a marinized 
version of the General Electric F110, offered a 30% increase 
in combat rated thrust as well as greater flexibility and 
maintainability. The F-14D also contained a new digital 
avionics package and the improved Hughes APG-71 radar for 
increased detection and targeting. The entire package of 
upgrades would allow the F-14D to perform its air superiority 
mission for the fleet well into the 21st century. 
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Despite meeting all major acquisition milestones and being 
within five percent of budget, the F-l4D program 
terminated by the 000 in 1991. This chapter examines the 
events surrounding the government's decision to modify and 
later cancel the F-l4 upgrade. 
B. BIRTH OF THE F-14A 
Battles fought in the Pacific Theater during World War II 
demonstrated the strategic importance of naval maritime force 
projection. Dominant naval forces were able to establish 
their own lines of communication (LOC), disrupt or sever the 
enemy's LOC, choose the time and place of offensive action, 
and, most importantly, carry the war to the enemy's homeland. 
By the end of the war, airpo\oier had become the dominant 
factor in the Pacific Theater. Naval battles were no longer 
fought between surface combatants, but at extended range by 
aircraft launched from opposing carriers or nearby islands. 
As a result of changing naval tactics, the battleship soon 
became obsolete and the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) 
rose to become the linchpin of U.S. Naval force projection. 
By the late 1950's, the U.S. Navy had over 50 aircraft 
carriers in service [Ref. 30:p. 24]. The large number of 
aircraft carriers in the U.S. Navy did not go unnoticed by the 
soviet union. As Cold War tensions increased, soviet Naval 
Aviation (SNA) incorporated the use of long-range bombers into 
its maritime strategy. More signi ficantly, the sov iets were 
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on the verge of producing offensive air-to-surface cruise 
missiles capable of hitting targets up to 150 :niles av;ay [Ref. 
31:p. 2]. Soviet bombers, armed with these stand-off cruise 
~issiles, could attack U.S. aircraft carriers prior to 
engagement by conventional fighters. 
The eXpanding Soviet bomber force, along with the growing 
cruise missile capability, vias becoming more than the existing 
F-4 fighter could defend against. Naval strategists 
recognized the shortconings of the F-4 and began planning for 
long-range fleet air defense fighter. The Navy 
required an aircraft that could carry a large quantity of air-
to-air missiles, have the endurance to remain on combat air 
patrol for several hours, and was capable of defeating Soviet 
bombers before they could launch their missiles at the 
American carriers. [Ref. 32:pp. 10-15J 
The Navy's first two attempts at developing an aircraft to 
meet the requisite features of its next fighter were 
unsuccessful. The first proposed candidate, the Douglas F-6D 
y.issileer, lacked versatility and was canceled by the 
Eisenhower Administration in 1960. The second candidate 
aircraft, the Grumman F-IIIB, was a naval variant of the 
General Dynamics F-Il1 strike aircraft. The F-IIIB was built 
to carry the AWG-9 intercept radar and the AIM-54 Phoenix 
long-range air-to-air missile which was capable of destroying 
enemy bombers before they came within range of the fleet. 
After experiencing numerous performance and weight growth 
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problems, the F-111B was deemed unsuitable for carrier 
operations. [Ref. 33:pp. 1-5] 
As ~avy and congressional support waned for the F-11lB, 
Grumman proactively submitted an unsolicited proposal, Design 
J03, as an alternative to the F-111B. This new design 
proposal would incorporate the F-111's engines, weapon systen, 
and variable sweep wing concept and place them on a more 
capable airframe. This design would later become known as the 
F-14 Tomcat. [Ref. 33:pp. 3-5J 
PROCUREMENT PLAN 
On January 14, 1969, only six months after the formal 
cancellation of the F-l11B program, Grumman Aerospace 
corporation was awarded a contract to build the F-14 as the 
Navy's next air superiority aircraft. The Navy negotiated 
separate contracts with Hughes Aircraft for the avionics 
systems and Pratt & Whitney for the engines. These two major 
items would be provided to Grumman as Government Furnished 
Equipment (GFE). [Ref. 33:p. 9] 
In retrospect, the most significant element of the F-l4 
contract was its engines. The F-l4 was designed around the 
Advanced Technology Engine which would not be available in 
time for initial production. In order to get the aircraft 
quickly to the fleet, the Naval Air Systems Command sanctioned 
a modified version of the F-111B engine for use in the Tomcat. 
This engine, the TF-30-P-4l2, would be installed in only the 
first 67 F-14s until Pratt &: Whitney delivered its new 
Advanced Technology Engine in 1970 [Ref. 34:p. 1]. These 
aircraft would be designated as F-14A's. 
At the end of the F-14A production cycle, it was assumed 
that the new F-401 ATE would be ready. Plans called for 643 
more aircraft to be produced with the new engine [Ref. 35:p. 
1] . These aircraft would be the F-14B model. 
Pratt and Whitney was unable to deliver the F-401 ATE in 
1970. As state of the art technology, the F-401 ATE 
developed problems in the areas of reliability, endurance, and 
ability to withstand rapid throttle movement. By 1971, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense had reduced the planned 
number of F-14s to 301 because of technical problems and cost 
overruns in the F-401 ATE program. [Ref. 35:p. 2] 
As problems continued to mount for the Advanced Technology 
Engine, the Navy continued to push back the expected delivery 
date for the F-401 ATE. Eventually, the Navy concluded that 
the cost of bringing the F-401 ATE to an acceptable level of 
reliability and performance was prohibitive. In March of 
1974, the Navy decided to terminate the F-401 ATE program. 
When the F-401 ATE program died, so did the F-14B and follow-
on programs. [Ref. 35:p. 3J 
The decision to cancel the F-401 ATE meant that all future 
production lots of the F-14 would be equipped with the older, 
less satisfactory TF-30 engine. The Pratt & Whitney TF-30 
engine had many faults which hindered the performance of the 
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F-l4. The engine was underpowered and lacked the thrust 
necessary to launch the aircraft from its carrier or to 
respond rapidly in aerial combat. The F-14A had to depend on 
an afterburner attached to the tailpipe of the engine to 
increase its power or thrust. Not only did afterburners add 
unnecessary weight to the aircraft, but its use also consulted 
large amounts of scarce fuel . continued use of the aircraft's 
afterburner significantly increased the risk of engine 
compressor stal ls. [Ref. 30:pp. 38-39] 
The TF-30 engine had poor throttle response and very small 
stall margin which made carrier landings both diff i cult and 
precarious. The reliability and maintainability of the engine 
was extremely poor. For every hour of flying time, Naval Air 
System Command estimated the fighter required about 49 man-
hours of maintenance work [Ref. 36:p. 30]. Failure in the fan 
sections of the engine caused in-flight fires which resulted 
in the loss of several aircraft [Ref. 37:p . 1 ] . To address 
its continued concerns with the TF-30 engine, the Navy 
instituted the F-l4 survivability Improvement Program to 
examine the F-14's engine reliability problem. 
Even though several improvements were made by the engine 
manufacturer to correct safety shortcomings of the TF-30 
engine, a permanent solution to remedy the F-14 engine 
deficiency was stalled . studies undertaken 1n the late 1970's 
to provide the F-14 with its true design thrust engine went 
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nowhere because of the emergence of a new internal threat, the 
lightweight fighter lobby. 
D. LIGHTWEIGHT FIGHTER LOBBY 
By the early 1970's, the high cost of the F-14A and its 
Phoenix weapon system had convinced many legislators that a 
large inventory of smaller, less expensive aircraft would 
better meet national defense needs. These legislators, led by 
Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin and Senator Symington, 
the farmer Secretary of the Air Farce, felt they had a better 
plan for the future of military aviation and set aut to 
advance their case for a new lightweight fighter. In 
september 1973, The SASe gave its guidance to the Department 
of the Navy an this issue: 
The committee believes the Navy should examine the 
potential of a completely new aircraft as a possible 
alternative to the F-14 in the out-years. The Navy should 
obtain proposals to determine if a smaller and presumably 
cheaper aircraft can be designed to serve as an air 
superiority fighter to complement the F-l4. Once this 
determination has been made, the committee desires to 
receive the Navy determination, including the costs of 
such alternatives as well as a technical evaluation. 
[Ref. 38:p. 3lJ 
The Navy's response to this guidance was the formation of a 
study group to examine the potential of a lightweight fighter 
to be the F-14 complement. 
Navy Fighter Study IV was the final product of this groups 
review of issues facing naval aviation. One of the most 
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important findings of the study highlighted the need for a 
mUlti-mission aircraft possessing both fighter and long-range 
strike capability [Ref. 39 :p. 31]. The need for a rnulti-
mission aircraft was driven not as much by need as it was by 
future afford ability concerns. The escalating cost of modern 
weaponry had seemingly numbered the days of specialized 
aircraft. 
In 1974, The Navy sought proposals from the aircraft 
industry for a new lightweight multi-mission fighter aircraft. 
Congress intervened in the acquisition process and directed 
the Navy to investigate versions of the General Dynamics YF-16 
and Northrop YF-l7 lightweight fighte r prototypes, then under 
evaluation by the U.S. Air Force. [Ref. 39 :pp. 32-36 J 
The Navy concluded that the General Dynamics design based 
on the F-16 was unsuitable for carrier operations. In the 
interim, McDonnell Douglas, with its expertise in building 
aircraft for the Navy, had teamed with Northrop to build the 
F/A-18 aircraft based on the Northrop YF-17 design . [Ref. 
30:p. 54] This aircraft, with minor modifications to its 
engines, fit the requirements sought by the Navy. The F/A-18 
aircraft was selected by the Navy as its premier strike 
fighter aircraft. McDonnell Douglas would be the prime 
contractor and Northrop, the associate. The F/A-18 had 
unusually strong support from several Congressmen who felt 
responsible for its inception. Leading the congressional 
support for the F/A-18 was Senator symington, whose district 
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in Missouri included the McDonnell Douglas corporate 
headquarters. [Ref. 39:pp. 32-36] 
The lightweight fighter lobby within the Navy considered 
the F-l.4 a potential threat to the existence of the F/A-~8. 
Navy actions implied that no improvements to the F-14 could be 
made which might make the F/A-~8 look unnecessary, 
inefficient, or too costly for the capability provided. 
Continued development of the F-~4 beyond its initial 
configuration model was significantly curtailed. Money for 
engine upgrades and the development of the F-~4 air-to-ground 
capability was diverted to the F/A-~8 program. Since the F/A-
18 was the designated strike fighter for the Navy, the Service 
went as far as to discourage F-~4 contractors from 
distributing photographs of their aircraft carrying air-to-
ground ordnance. [Ref. 30:p. 55] 
The paucity of funds to perform much needed upgrades to 
the F-~4A would continue for several years. It was not until 
Fiscal Year ~977 (FY 77) that Congress would authorize money 
to conduct research and development for a new F-~4 eng ine 
[Ref. 40:p. 1]. By this date, at least six aircraft had been 
lost, directly due to engine problel!ls [Ref. 41:pp. 9-~5] 
E. THB 7-110 ADVAHCII TECHNOLOGY EJlGINB 
The F-~4 procurement plan had originally called for 
limited prodUction of the F-~4A, followed by extensive 
production of the F-14B, with improved engines. A version 
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designated F-l4C had also been envisioned as a follow-on in 
the late 1970's. It was to have improved avionics, radar and 
fire control systems, but this program died in the conceptual 
stages along with the F-40l engine and the F-14B. [Ref. J4:p. 
2J 
The breakthrough for a new fighter engine for the F-14A 
came with the development of the General Electric FlOl 
Derivative Fighter Engine (OFE) originally designed as a 
replacement for the U.S. Air Force F-15 and F-16 fighters. A 
naval version of this engine, the FII0-GE-400, would finally 
provide the F-14 with many of the critical features it had 
been missing. 
The General Electric F-ll0-GE-400 Advanced Technology 
Engine was able to produce over 27,100 pounds of thrust, a 30% 
increase in combat rated thrust over the TF-30 engine [Ref. 
30:p. 42]. Use of the new engine eliminated the need for 
afterburners on catapult launches. Fuel savings increased 
time on station for combat air patrol missions by 34%. This 
translated into an estimated 31 minutes of combat air patrol 
loiter time at 150 nautical miles (nm) or a patrol radius 
extension of l14nm [Ref. 30:p. 42). The F-II0 engine had no 
restriction for angle of attack operations and was able to 
increase the speed and acceleration of the aircraft throughout 
its flight envelope. Throttle restrictions were eliminated as 
were bothersome engine compressor stalls which haunted the TF-
30 engine. with the F-IIO, the Navy had finally found an 
engine to make the F-14 the total air superiority fighter it 
was envisioned to be. 
F. 'l'HE NEED FOR A !lEW FIGH'l'ER 
The crucial impetus for the first major upgrade to the 
F-14 would finally come in the early 1980's, from the new 
secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), John Lehman. Considered by 
some in the Navy to be acerbic and overly ambitious, Lehman 
was nonetheless both a skilled politician and staunch 
proponent of naval power. 
As SECNAV, Lehman pushed a maritime strategy agenda which 
was predominately offensive in nature. He believed that the 
reason we had a Navy was to fight the soviets, offensively, by 
assembling and sending carriers forward. During the initial 
phase of maritime strategy execution known as "seizing the 
initiative," carrier battle groups (CV8G) would establish 
sanctuaries to conduct operations. The predominant fighter 
mission during this phase was defending the CVBG and other 
maritime assets from Soviet airborne threats, such as bombers 
and cruise missiles. For a fighter to be effective in this 
environment, it required endurance, supersonic performance, a 
powerful radar, extremely sophisticated avionics, and multl-
shot weapon capability. [Ref. 43:p. 103] 
During follow-on phases of the maritime strategy, power 
projection strike support became the dominant fighter mission. 
Here, the fighter was required to defeat sophisticated enemy 
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air defense threats and take the battle to the enemy through 
offensive actions. To operate effectively in a power 
projection arena, a fighter needed an excellent turn rate, 
endurance, overland lookdown radar, quality medium and short 
range weapons, and sel f-protection avionics. [Ref . 43: pp . 
103-104] 
Even though many of the dual mission requirements inherent 
in the maritime strategy were met by the F/A-18, its 
relatively short range, low-power radar, and air-to-air 
limitations suggested a more special i zed fighter was needed to 
conduct the outer air battle. 
On 9 December, 1982, the Navy Decision Resource Board 
(ORB) determined that an upgrade to the F-14A, designated the 
F-14D, was the most cost-effective method to improve carrier 
battle group outer air battle effectiveness [Ref. 43:p. llJ. 
The F-14A aircraft, which had been in production with the same 
basic configuration since 1969, was rapidly becominq obsolete 
due to Soviet advances in bomber technology, long-range cruise 
missi l es, and electronic countermeasures. The decision was 
confirmed in a SECNAV memorandum of 6 July 1983, which 
d el ineated the required performance capabilities of the 
upgraded F-14. Requirements included higher thrust and more 
reliable engines to increase tactical effectiveness against 
advanced. threats and to correct significant operational and. 
safety problems associated with the TF-30 engine; new avionics 
to incorporate 000 directed inter-operability programs; and an 
upgraded radar to ensure multi-target, multi-shot capability 
existed in the more severe ECM environment projected for the 
future. [Ref. 34:pp. 1-5J 
In addition to the performance requirements, Lehman's 
memorandum also gave guidance in the areas of schedule and 
cost. The acquisition schedule of the F-14D was driven by the 
need to get the aircraft into the field as quickly as possible 
due to the emerging SNA threat. The Navy's ambitious plans 
called for a full-scale development effort of five years, 
followed by fleet introduction of the new aircraft in FY 90 
[Ref. 44:p. 37]. The F-14D's schedule represented a 50% 
reduction in the time normally required for acquisition 
programs during this era. Cost for the F-14D development 
program was capped by the SECNAV at $855M [Ref. 43:p. 7J. 
within this threshold, limitations were set at $750M for the 
contractor and 105M for Navy in-house costs [Ref. 45:p. 11]. 
'l'HE DEVELOPXBN'l' OJ' 'l'BB J'-1.4D 
Due to the requirements imposed by the SECNAV, only one 
contractor, Grumman Aerospace corporation of New York, 
possessed the requisite design skills and production 
facilities to manufacture the F-14D. In July 1984, the U.S. 
Navy and Grumman signed an incrementally funded, fixed price, 
full scale development contract for the design, development, 
and qualification of the F-14D. The upgrade of the F-l4oA to 
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the F-14D essentially was comprised of three elements: engine, 
avionics, and radar. 
1. Engine 
The engine upgrade involved removing the TF-30 engines 
manufactured by Pratt & Whitney, and replacing them with the 
General Electric F-II0-GE-400 ATE. As previously discussed, 
the F-110 engine offered SUbstantial increases in operability, 
safety, mission effectiveness, durability, and maintainability 
over the troublesome TF-30 engine. 
since the basic F-II0 engine had been flight tested in 
the F-l4A with excellent results and had undergone extensive 
flight testing under the Air Force development program, the 
Secretary of the Navy also approved an Engineering Change 
Proposal to install the engine in a limited number of new and 
retrofitted F-14A airframes [Ref. 46:p. 4]. This modification 
would be called the F-14A+. The requirement for the F-14A+ 
was necessitated by the safety and operability problems 
associated with the TF-30 engine. 
2. Avionics 
The avionics upgrade replaced the 1960's vintage 
analog system with a new digital system architecture. Other 
avionics changes included a Joint Tactical Information 
Distribution System (JTIDS) for secure communication and 
battlefield information; an advanced Self Protection Jamming 
system (ASPJ) and a new Radar Warning Receiver (ALR-67) for 
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improved defensive electronic countenneasures~ and the Infra-
red Search and Track (IRST) for long-range air-to-air target 
detection [Ref. 43:p. 11]. The F-14D also incorporated 
advanced control and display techniques, similar to those 
designed for the F/A-18, to decrease the pilot workload. One 
technique, called Hands on Throttle and stick (HOTAS) , allowed 
the pilot to perfonn cockpit chores without removing his hands 
from the primary controls [Ref. 42:p. 106). Another, the 
improved Heads up Display (HUD) , allowed the pilot to read his 
flight instruments and status display without looking down 
into the cockpit [Ref. 42:pp. 105-106]. 
Radar 
The installation of a new AN/APG-71 radar in the F-14D 
offered a six-fold processing improvement over the F-14A's 
analog system and improved target detection and tracking 
capabilities in a heavy enemy electronic cOllntenneasures 
environment by 40 percent [Ref. 42: p. 105]. 
The F-14D was designed to be a tremendolls improvement 
over the original F-14A. The entire package of upgrades would 
allow the F-14D to perform its air superiority mission for the 
fleet well into the 21st century. 
H. ACQO:I8:I'l'701f S'l'RATBGY 
The F-14D was developed under a fixed price, not-to-exceed 
(NTE) contract with specific guidance from the SECNAV to avoid 
all possible configuration changes after program initiation. 
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The total buy of new F-140 aircraft was established at 304 
aircraft. There were to be purchases of 7 F-140s in FY 88, 18 
in FY 89,30 for FY 90-97, and 39 in FY 98 [Ref. 43:p. 10]. 
The contract called for the first F-140 to be delivered in 
March 1990. 
To manage the key variables of cost, schedule, and weapon 
system performance of the F-140 program, several of the 
following concepts were integrated into the acquisition 
strategy by the Program Manager. 
1. commonality 
The F-140 program was designed to reduce cost and 
minimize risk by using systems that were common with other 
Navy and Air Force aircraft. This would allow the F-140 to 
benefit from development efforts which were already underway, 
or which had been completed by other aircraft programs. 
Additional benefits would also be gained in the form of 
reduced production and logistics support costs as a result of 
their commonality. 
Virtually all the major systems in the F-140 had 
extensive commonality with other aircraft. The General 
Electric F-II0-GE-400 engine used in the F-14D was nearly 
identical to the Air Force F-110-GE-I00 engine used in the F-
16 fighter. There was an 80% commonality of parts between the 
engines (Ref. 44:p. 37]. The Department of the Navy was able 
to greatly reduce the technical risk in the F-14D program by 
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selecting the derivative of an aircraft engine which had 
recently completed over several thousand hours of testing. 
A considerable portion of the new F-14 avionics suite 
was common to the F/A-18, AV-S8, and A-6E aircraft. Common 
avionics systems included the AN/AYK-14 computer, ALR-67 radar 
warning receiver, AN/ALQ-165 airborne self-protection jammer, 
ASN-130 inertial navigation system, and a multitude of other 
components. The planned avionics weapon replaceable assembly 
(WRA) commonality with existing aircraft was over SO percent. 
[Ref. 44:p. 37] 
The Hughes APG-71 digital signal processing radar not 
only used seven of fourteen weapon replaceable assemblies from 
its analog AWG-9 radar derivative but also utilized many of 
the improvements developed for the USAF F-15 multi-stage 
improvement program. [Ref. 43:p. 12] 
2 • Concurrency 
Due to the compressed acquisition cycle mandated by 
the SECNAV, schedule risk was considered moderate to high for 
the F-14D program. To ameliorate schedule risk, the Program 
Manager planned to concurrently develop and produce the 
aircraft. Not only would concurrency ensure an earlier 
introduction of the F-14D into the fleet but also keep the 
Grumman F-14 production line operating at its minimum economic 
efficiency rate of one aircraft per month. 
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3. Preplanned Product Improvement 
Every major sUbsystem involving target acquisition, 
identification or targeting was purchased directly by the Navy 
and provided to Grumman as Government Furnished Equipment 
(GFE). Many of these DoD directed programs (JTIDS, ASPJ, and 
IRST) were still in development and posed considerable risk to 
the F-14D program should their development lag [Ref. 47 :pp. 
31-32]. To alleviate this schedule risk, the Program Manager 
adopted a preplanned product improvement strategy which 
allowed other radar/avionics objectives to be met, independent 
of the status of the directed programs. The F-14D aircraft 
would be designed and configured to incorporate these directed 
program improvements at a future date, if necessary. 
... cost Reduction 
The full-scale development contract with Grumman 
included the procurement and integration of engines, radar, 
and a digital avionics system as well as the integration of 
all GFE systems. To reduce the government's risk to cost 
growth, a fixed-price with economic price adjustment contract 
was used. Even though fixed-price contracts are normally 
considered too risky for high technology programs, the Navy 
felt the low amount of RDT&E needed combined with the 
sufficiency of cost control history for Grumman made the 
fiXed-price type contract a sound choice. 
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By using a fixed-price contract, Grumman was obligated 
to deliver the terms of the contract, regardless of the actual 
cost. This shifted the majority of the financial risk from 
the Navy to Grumman. If Grumman's actual cost to deliver the 
aircraft was greater than the contractual price, the 
contractor lost money. Conversely, if Grumman's actual cost 
was lower than the contractual price, a profit was made. 
Grumman was motivated to contain cost growth within the 
program to obtain greater profit. 
The Department of the Navy, as the major advocate for 
the F-14D, saw the aircraft as a low cost, high performance 
replacement for the F-14A in the outer air battle. As such, 
the acquisition program was designed to manage the key 
parameters of cost, schedule, and performance. Program costs 
during full-scale development, for example, were capped by the 
SECNAV. Cost reduction strategies such as the use of firm 
fixed-price contracts, commonality, and preplanned product 
improvement were also used to limit cost increases. Schedule 
risk was managed by the judicious use of concurrency during 
certain key phases of development and testing. Performance 
risk was reduced by the wide use of proven technology from the 
Air Force and other Navy programs. 
I. THE 1'-14D 18 PRE8ENTED TO CONGRE88 
Armed with a validated mission need and approval for the 
F-14D aircraft's development from the 050, the Navy requested 
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large scale increases in RDT&E funding from Congress for FY 
85. 
In devising its strategy to market the F-14D to Congress, 
the Navy had anticipated congressional concerns to focus on 
the affordability aspects of the program. Instead, 
deliberations in both the House and Senate focused not on the 
affordability of the program, but on the improved safety 
aspects of the program and competition. 
In the HAC, Representatives Young of Florida and Addabbo 
of New York set the tone for deliberations on the F-14D 
program by focusing on the TF-30 engine. 
Mr.YOUNG. I am wondering why we don't write the engines 
[TF-30] off as a bad deal, sell them to somebody or scrap 
them, and take out the parts or put new engines in a good 
airplane to make the airplane reliable ... when you think 
about losing the life of the crew, and it is a tWo-man 
crew in this airplane, I don't know, sometimes you have to 
take your losses and you cut and run. You [Admiral 
Schoultz] have confirmed the fears about the TF-30 engine 
that I have heard from some of your people that fly them. 
[Ref. 48:p. 347] 
Likewise, in the SASe, the F-14D program found an advocate 
in Senator John Warner, the former Secretary of the Navy. 
senator Warner not only highlighted the performance 
improvements of the F-14D engine over its TF-30 predecessor 
during testimony, but advocated accelerating this portion of 
the upgrade program. 
Senator WARNER. You have to wait until 1987 [to upgrade 
the engine]? 
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Admiral SCHOULTZ. To put them in the airplane. Hopefully 
they will start buying them before that. The problem is 
trying to get everything underneath the tent money wise. 
We hope to have a balanced program. 
senator WARNER. I would like to have the Secretary of the 
Navy provide me with a program for upgrading that airplane 
in a period shorter than 1987. If it is fiscal 
considerations, then we can address those here in the 
Congress. If it is conditional funding for R&D, likewise 
we can address that here in Congress. From my own point 
of view, I think it is unacceptable to have a program that 
was initiated back in the early seventies and still be not 
fulfilled here in the eighties. [Ref. 49:p. 2066] 
In the Senate Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations, 
deliberations on the F-~4D were dominated by discussion on 
competition, a topic which had recently been hotly debated in 
Congress and the acquisition community. Senator Ted Stevens, 
Chairman of the committee, openly questioned the Navy's 
methodology for selecting the F-~~O engine: 
Senator stevens. The Air Force is still buying F-IOOs. 
They have not told us that they are going to stop buying 
F-IOOs. You have just selected the F-~lO without any kind 
of competition for your use. 
Admiral Schoultz. Yes, sir. We had an option to go 
either one, and this one fits into that aircraft very 
well, and does all of the things we need to do .... 
Senator Stevens. The Air Force has been touting very 
heavily to us the cost savings that have come about from 
their competition. Your numbers were not included in 
their competition. Why didn't you compete? 
Admiral Busey. There were options in the Air Force 
competition for Navy aircraft ... The Secretary's guidance 
to us a year ago was that we will select an engine from 
the Air Force competition. Therefore, the competition 
knew all along that the Navy was going to make a 
selection, and that we would not run our own competition. 
[Ref. 50:pp. ~96-197J 
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Questions submitted by advocates of the F-14D such as 
Senator D'Amato of New York, tried to defuse the competition 
issue. 
Question. Please describe the provision (s) of the Air 
Force's request for proposal for its engine competition 
which put the competitors on notice that the Navy would be 
making its engine selection on the basis of the Air 
Force's competit ion . 
Answer. The USAF request for proposals did address Navy 
production quality options. Both the General Electric and 
the Pratt & Whitney proposals included acknowledgement of 
the RFP line item and provided not-to-exceed (NTE) priced 
options for the Navy engines. 
Question. Did the Navy receive any protests or comments 
concerning its decision to base its engine selection on 
the Air Force progress? 
Answer. The Navy received no formal protests nor 
substantive comments on its decision to base its engine 
selection on the Ai r Force competition. There was 
certainly full awareness of the Navy's intent ion to do so, 
based on wide circulation of the contents of the Secretary 
of the Navy's Memorandum dated 6 July 1983 . [Ref . 50:pp. 
262-263] 
congressional testimony and debate on the F-14D tended to 
skirt the issues of affordabil ity during its first major 
discussion before Congress. Congressional advocates for the 
F-14D attempted to sell the safety merits of the program to 
their colleagues. In doing so, they hoped to equate support 
for the F-14D program with support for operational safety 
within the military. Other members of Congress, such as 
Senator Stevens openly questioned specific aspects of the 
program such as competition. In the end, the F-14D program 
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received the full amount of funds requested; it had passed its 
first major hurdle. 
J. GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS 
When President Reagan entered office in 1981, he targeted 
a balanced budget as a key objective of his administration. 
speaking on this sUbject, in his first inaugural address, 
Reagan stated: 
For decades we have piled deficit upon deficit, 
mortgaging our future and our children's future for the 
temporary convenience of the present. To continue this 
long trend is to guarantee tremendous social, cultural, 
political and economic upheavals ... It is time to ... get 
government back wi thin its means, and to lighten our 
punitive tax burden. And these will be our first 
priorities, and on these principles, there will be no 
compromise. [Ref. 5:p. 72] 
By 1985, however, the federal deficit had nearly tripled 
in amount and doubled as a percentage of Gross National 
Product [Ref. 5:p. 5J. In a bid to reduce the budget deficit 
and federal outlays, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings(GRH) Act of 
1985 was passed. The GRH Act prescribed a series of annual 
deficit reductions, culminating in a balanced budget by FY 91. 
To enforce its deficit reduction policy, the GRH Act 
established a sequestration process by which congressional 
appropriations could be superseded by automatic cutbacks if 
deficit targets were not met. 
The GRH Act threw not just the F-14D, but the entire 
future of naval aviation into doubt. 
Senator Sasser ••.. By the final year of Gramm-Rudman, in 
1991, I see the Navy plans to increase the number of 
aircraft procured by 55 percent. Now how does the Navy 
realistically expect to achieve that goal in view of the 
budget trends of fewer dollars for defense? 
Admiral Martin. We are looking at trying to maintain, 
within the fiscal constraints that we have, a balanced and 
affordable program. Our budget that we are lying out for 
the 5-year defense plan is one that we think is achievable 
and is executable within the fiscal constraints that we 
have. But it is going to take a lot of moving and very 
careful management of our resources. [Ref. 51:p. 206] 
Even though the GRH Act would later be overturned by the 
Supreme Court, the budgetary debates that followed GRH 
enactment started a trend in reduced defense spending, the 
impact which would be felt throughout the defense community. 
It. PROGRAH RESTRUC'I'ORING 
The original acquisition strategy for the F-14D weapon 
system called for the production of 304 new aircraft. The 
changing fiscal climate caused by the GRH legislation; 
however, forced the SECNAV to revisit the original F-14D 
production objectives. On 17 September 1986, Lehman directed 
that procurement of new-production F-14Ds would be 
supplemented with the remanufacture of F-14As into F-14Ds 
[Ref. S2:p. 13]. This change, he hoped, would not only speed 
the introduction of the F-14D into the fleet but also ease 
fiscal problems exacerbated by decreased funding within the 
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). 
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On 25 November 1986, A Program Change Approval Document 
was signed, changing the total quantity of F-14D aircraft to 
be procured from 304 to 527 [Ref. 46:p. 4]. To execute 
Lehman's guidance in the most effective manner, the Navy cut 
its purchase of 304 new Grumman F-140s to a buy of 127 [Ref. 
46:p. 4J. The Navy's new procurement schedule called for the 
purchase of seven F-14Ds in FY 88 and then annual procurement 
of 12 aircraft through 1998 [Ref. 53 :p. 18J. The Navy's 
request for 12 new F-140s per year was based on the need to 
offset projected attrition of fleet aircraft and to maintain 
a minimum economic production rate at Grumman's Long Island, 
N.Y. facilities [Ref. 53:p. 18]. 
The Navy also planned to remanufacture 400 F-14As into the 
F-140 configuration beginning in 1990. Under the F-14D 
remanufacturing program, selected F-14A aircraft would be 
stricken administratively from the Navy's inventory and 
provided as government furnished material to the contractor. 
The remanufacture of the F-14A would include rewiring, 
overhaul, and service-life extension as well as the 
installation and integration of the new radar, avionics, and 
engine. The remanufactured F-14D would be identical in 
performance and configuration to a new-production aircraft. 
[Ref. 54:p. 235] 
The Navy also viewed the remanufacture program as an 
opportunity to introduce competition into the F-14D program. 
This was done not only to lower the overall cost of the 
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program but to address criticism levied by some members of 
Congress during past deliberations. The acquisition strategy 
directed that the first lot of six aircraft would be split 
between Grumman and a second source. Grumman was 
competitively awarded a contract to remanufacture four 
aircraft with the sole purpose of developing a technical data 
package. The two remaining aircraft of the first lot would be 
remanufactured by the second source to validate the data 
package. To assure a wartime mobilization base, lot 2 would 
be equally split between Grumman and the second source. The 
remaining lots were to be competed between Grumman and the 
second source on a yearly basis. [Ref. 47:pp. 8-9] 
The new procurement profile for the F-140 program, which 
included 127 new production aircraft and 400 remanufactured 
aircraft represented a 73%: increase in the number of F-14Ds 
available for combat at an estimated 19%: increase in cost 
versus the previous profile of 304 new production aircraft 
[Ref. 54:p. 235J. Lehman believed the new F-14D aircraft mix 
obtained the greatest warfighting capability for each year's 
budget and was the least costly option available for obtaining 
an all F-140 force. 
L. THE CASE AGAINST THE F-14D 
By late 1988, opposition to the F-14D program began to 
emerge in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (050). The 
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opposition was led by David Chu, the Assistant secretary of 
Defense for Program Analysis and EValuation (PA&E). 
As Assistant Secretary for PA&E, Chu's job was to analyze 
the relative costs and merits of the major weapon systems 
purchased by 000. The duties of the PA&E office were outlined 
by one former Assistant Secretary during congressional 
hearings. 
As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program 
Analysis and Evaluation, my main role would be to advise 
the Secretary of Defense on issues involving force 
structure, choices between alternative weapon systems, 
scenarios on which our planning should be based, the 
capabilities of alternative forces and what they cost, and 
similar matters of central importance in defense planning. 
[Ref. 55:pp. 11-12] 
The influence of the PA&E office wi thin the eSD had grown 
significantly during the budget-conscious years of the late 
1980's. As a member of the Defense Resources and Planning 
Board (DRPB) and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the two 
primary decision-making forums for the 050, Chu was in a 
powerful position to influence acquisition decisions. With 
the defense budget continuing to decrease in terms of real 
growth, Chu's recommendations to cut waste and eliminate 
uneconomical programs gathered support. 
Chu was opposed. to new F-14D prod.uction. He believed that 
in an attempt to keep the Grumman production line open, DoD 
was deliberately buying- aircraft in low quantities. The 
effect of this policy was to drive up the unit cost of each 
75 
aircraft. Chu estimated that the 12 F-14D aircraft scheduled 
for production in FY 89 would cost the government nearly $75 
million each. This cost was three times greater than the $23 
million price paid for the Navy's other carrier-based fighter, 
the F/A-18 Hornet. [Ref. 36:p. 4] 
Chu favored the continued remanufacturing of F-14 aircraft 
as a cost-effective means to upgrade the fighter fleet. 
Remanufacturing, he believed, invested scarce dollars into 
areas of the F-14 which needed the most improvement: engines, 
radar, and avionics. with the Navy scheduled to receive an 
aircraft-carrier version of the Air Farce's Advanced Tactical 
Fighter (NATF) by the year 2000, Chu also cautioned against 
procuring airframe life that would not be used. A newly built 
F-14D with an estimated 25-30 year lifespan, would be replaced 
by the NATF long before its airframe fatigue life had expired. 
A remanufactured F-14D with an expected 10-15 year lifespan; 
however, would phase out nicely with the arrival of NATF. 
[Ref. 36:p. 26] 
His argument against new F-14D production was further 
bolstered by the Navy's own "Naval Aviation Requirements" 
report released in early January 1989. The report recommended 
that the mix of aircraft assigned to aircraft carriers be 
changed, with fewer F-14s on each. More significantly, the 
report said the F-l4 was the only aircraft in surplus, an 
assertion that gave Chu more ammunition to attack the program. 
[Ref. 36:pp. 26-27] 
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On 9 January 1989, just prior to leaving office, President 
Reagan submitted his FY 90 budget to Congress. Included in 
his request was $1. 3 billion for 12 new F-14Ds and six 
remanufactured F-14As [Ref. 36:p. 36J. After Bush succeeded 
Reagan later that month, he announced deep spending cuts and 
requested agencies to resubmit their FY 90 budgets. For the 
Department of Defense, this meant a $10 billion budget 
reduction. 
For Chu, the budget resubmission offered a golden 
opportunity to kill new F-14D production. He found an ally in 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology 
(U5D(A&T)), John Costello, who had also targeted low-volume 
purchases for termination. On 10 April 1989, the DRPB decided 
to kill new F-14D production. Two weeks later, the SEC:JEF, 
Richard Cheney, announced the termination decision in 
testimony before the HASC. 
THE BATTLE ON CAPITOL HILL 
Debate on the fate of the F-14D program now shifted to the 
Defense Committees of both the House and senate. Advocates of 
the program, led by the New York congressional delegation, 
attacked the SECDEF's termination decision not from an 
affordability viewpoint, but one of national security. 
Several Congressmen argued that the decision to terminate new 
F-14D production essentially eliminated Grumman as an airframe 
manufacturer. This, they claimed, had dire consequences for 
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both the industrial base and the future of naval aviation 
cotr.petition. 
Senator D'A1nato. If we eliminate the F-14D, what about 
competitiveness in the future as it relates to the naval 
needs? Are we not going to have just one source? .. Mr. 
Chairman, I think what we are talking about is the 
destruction of an industrial base called Grumman that 
provides competitiveness at this time. This is just not 
a situation '."here we are cutting back on a plane that is 
not necessary; we are talking about a plane that is 
absolutely necessary ... If the F-14D is eliminated, Grumman 
will no longer be able to compete as an effective force in 
air production. [Ref. 56:pp. 391-392J 
senator Sasser. I just ·."ant to frankly say Senator 
D'Amato's statement about jeopardizing the future 
industrial base for Navy fighter production is persuasive 
to me. I fear that we are going down the path of the Navy 
relying on one manufacturer to meet Navy fighter needs. 
It has been ny experience just watching the budget figures 
that when we start relying on solely one manufacturer the 
taxpayers end up paying a substantial premium for what 
they receive. [Ref. 56:p. 812J 
Secretary Cheney, in explaining his reasoning behind the 
termination decision, attempted to counter these assertions. 
The greater our surge capability , the greater our 
ability in peacetime to have competition between competing 
systems - all of those things are to be valued. The 
problem, of course, is how much are you willing to pay for 
that. If you look at the F-14D decision ... the new 
production line was operating at a rate of one a month, 
and the cost, ran somewhere between $51 million and $75 
million per copy, to buy 12 F-l4Ds a year. This is a very 
high price to keep a production line open. Given there 
are other contractors that are out there in the 
business .•• we are indeed in a position to know that we 
will have the industrial base we need to meet our needs in 
the years ahead. [Ref. 56:pp. 44-45J 
Several Congressmen also challenged OSD's assertion 
concerning F-14 fighter Data were presented by 
senator D'Amato of New York which showed shortages in naval 
fighter forces beginning in the 1996-97 timeframe, if new 
F-l4D production was cut. By the year 2007, the discrepancy 
·.,.as expected to reach 21 percent. With a three year slippage 
in NATF deliveries, the shortfall would increase to .')3 
percent. Senator D'Amato argued that the NATF ",'as still in 
the conceptual phase and that experience had shown :oint ~lavy-
A:..r Force aircraft developments to be disastrous. Should t,ATF 
flounder, the Navy would be left without a modern air 
superiority aircraft for fleet air defense. This scenario, he 
viewed, was an unacceptable risk to national security. 
N. THE SEARCH FOR COMPROMISE 
After deliberations ended on the amended Fiscal 1990 
Defense Authorization Bill, the SASC and HASC took different 
directions on the F-14D issue. The SASC sided with the SECDEF 
and did not authorize funds for new F-14D production. The 
HASC, however, restored funding to the program. 
resurrecting the F-14D, the committee expressed concern that 
termination of production "may be hastily conceived and 
premature." The committee recommended procurement of 12 
F-14Ds in FY 90 and provided advanced procurement for 12 
production aircraft the following year. [Ref. 57:p. 19] 
The move to restore funds to the F-14D program by the HASC 
was a serious rebuke of the Secretary Cheney. Responding to 
the committee's decision to restore funds for the F-14D, 
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Cheney called the restoration "short-sighted." He believed 
the decision to keep the F-14D line open would cost $1 billion 
more than the recommended plan to remanufacture old aircraft 
and would also result in 30% fewer F-14Ds in the Navy's 
inventory. [Ref. 58:p. 15] 
During joint conference between the House and Senate, a 
political compromise was reached. The Congress authorized 
another year's production of new F-14Ds (18 each) on the 
condition that Grumman sign an agreement stating that it would 
not seek fUrther production of new F-14Ds [Ref. 59:p. 30 ] . 
This agreement, when signed by Grumman, would effectively end 
new F-14D production at 37 aircraft. 
'l'HE 'l'ERMINA'l'ION 01" 'l'HE F-14D 
By 1991, the demise of the Soviet Union as a superpower 
had forced wholesale changes in the way the Navy viewed 
warfare. Testifying before Congress, the SECNAV expressed the 
Service's vision on modernization and force structure. 
The key that makes maintaining force structure and 
modernization simultaneously possible is an important 
shift in the character of the threat we are facing. Most 
significantly, for our purposes, the long range air 
defense threat, posed by ASM carrying Backfires, Bears and 
Badgers is diminished primarily because the likelihood of 
a major confrontation with the Soviets has decreased. At 
the same time, the full integration of AEGIS into the 
fleet's air defense capabilities has improved our overall 
air defense posture. Unfortunately, we saw no similar 
change in the nature of the threat as it relates to strike 
warfare requirements. In fact, the opposite is true. The 
number of sophisticated lADS [Integrated Air Defense 
Systems] and associated weapons in the third world are 
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growing. The analysis led us to conclude that we could 
afford to put less effort into AAW [Air-to-Air Warfare 
and modernize plans in the strike warfare area. [Ref. 
60:p. 509) 
On 26 February 1991. Secretary Cheney terminated the 
Grumman F-14D remanufacturing program for the convenience of 
the government. The Navy also ordered General Electric to end 
production of 24 F-110 engines and spares for previously 
designated aircraft conversion. A cancellation notice also 
went out to Hughes which supplied the AN/APG-71 radar for the 
F-14D model. [Ref. 61:p. 71J 
The main reason all production on the F-14D was ordered 
ter);'linated was revealed a few days later when 000 announced 
that it · .... anted the Navy to develop and buy new versions of the 
F/A-18, the F/A-18 ElF. The decision to procure the F/A-18 
ElF was questioned by nany within the Navy and was openly 
criticized by former SECNAV Lehman who viewed the F/A-18 as 
lacking the range and payload required to perform the deep 
strike mission or to provide extended range fleet air defense. 
F/A-18 proponents countered these criticisms by highlighting 
the Hornet's superior reliability, maintainability, 
survivability, and foreign military sales potential compared 
to the F-14. The Navy's decision to go with the F/A-18 ElF 
aircraft vice the F-14D was driven economically by OSD's 
decision to cut aircraft funding by nearly half in the FYDP. 
The procurement of the F/A-18 ElF would allow the Navy to 
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maintain its proj ected force structure during future 
downsizing. {Ref. 62:p. 25] 
Grumman offered the Pentagon long term price guarantees, 
in April of 1991, on the F-14D and F-14 derivatives in an 
attempt to get the aircraft into the FY 92 Budget. In a 
letter to Cheney, the Grumman Aerospace Corporation Chairrr,an, 
Renso corporali, attempted to price competitively the F-14 
against the F/A-IS ElF. He also committed Grumman to broad 
development of the F-14D Quick strike, an F-14D derivative 
with added air-to-ground attack capabilities. Corporali's 
offer · ... as seen as a last ditch effort on the part of Grumman 
to reopen the partially closed F-14 production line. [Ref. 
63:p. 24~ 
Although the proposal sounded promising, Navy officials 
questioned whether Grumman would be able to hold to its stated 
rates and prices. In the end, the proposal was rejected by 
This effectively signalled the end of Grumman's F-14D 
program. 
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
1\. INTRODUCTION 
Decisions on major weapon systems programs are complex and 
inherently controversial because they involve the security of 
the nation, large budgets, and organizational missions. The 
F-14 upgrade program was marked by four major decisions. The 
first ,,'as the 1984 Navy decision to upgrade the F-14A to the 
The F-l4D included higher thrust, more reliable 
englnes, state of the art Navy standardized digital 
electronics, upgraded avionics, and upgraded radar. The 
entire package of upgrades ""auld allow the F-l4D tu 
effectively perform its outer air battle mission for the 
fleet. 
Secretary Lehman's decision to restructure the F-l4D 
program was the second major decision. The restructuring 
reduced the Navy's planned purchase of 304 ne"" Grumrr.an F-14Do; 
to a buy of 127 and initiated a remanufacture program to 
convert 400 F-14As into the F-14D configuration. 
secretary cheney's decision to halt new F-14D production 
""as the third and most controversial decision. It marked the 
first widespread disagreement among the major acquisition 
participants on the direction of the F-14D program. The 
83 
decision was temporarily reversed through negotiation and 
comprorr,ise in Congress. 
The fourth major decision, the termination of the 
remanufacture program, was made during the middle of the Gulf 
War by Cheney, a more experienced, popular, Secretary of 
Defense, who was at the height of power. with the exception 
of the New York congressional delegation, this decision ""ent 
unchallenged and effectively ended the F-14 upgrade prograQ. 
This chapter analyzes the organizational and political 
factors involved in each of these decisions through the use of 
Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model of Decision-naking. 
Allison's model provides a useful framework for understanding 
the actions and motivations of institutional and political 
actors as they carried out their roles in the acquisition 
process. 
B. ALLISON'S BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL 
The Bureaucratic Politics Model was one of three models 
developed by Graham T. Allison, a professor of politics at 
Harvard, to explain decision-making during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. Even though his focus was on foreign policy decision-
making, Allison's model can be used to analyze government 
decisions about the military, including weapons procurement 
decisions. 
The model says that many actors who are positioned 
hierarChically within the governwent make decisions based on 
bargaining. These leaders, who have ascended to the top of 
the bureaucratic apparatus, share power within the Govern;nent. 
3ecause of enduring differences among individuals on most 
issues, decisions are resolved politically. In this model, 
decisions, structures, and policies emerge from an ongoing 
p!:ocess of bargaining and negotiation a;nong key individuals 
"nd coalitions. 
DECISION 1 - PROGRAM INITIATION 
The impetus for the upgrade to the F-14 came from the then 
secretary of the Navy, John Lehman. Prior to Lehman's 
arrival, support for an F-14 upgrade had been weak. ManGY for 
an engine upgrade, for example, had been diverted to the F/A-
18 program. LikGwise, developI:1ent of the F-l4' s air-to-ground 
capability had been blocked by the lightweight fighter lobby. 
As an advocate for the F-14 upgrade program, Lehman sought 
approval feom the other two key participants in the 
acquisition process, aso and Congress. From 050, Lehman 
sought budgetary approval and integration of his budget 
request into the administration's military, economic, and 
policy goals. From Congress, Lehman sought broad political 
support and continued funding. The primary means used by the 
Navy to gain support for the F-140 upgrade was through program 
design. 
The Department of the Navy saw the F-140 as a low cost, 
high performance replacement for the F-l4A in the outer air 
85 
battle. As such, the P-14D upgrade acquisition program · ... as 
designed to manage the key parameters of cost, schedule, and 
performance. Program costs during full-scale development, for 
example, were capped by the SECNAV. Cost reduction strategies 
such as the use of fixed-price type contracts, conmonality, 
and preplanned product improvement were also used to limit 
cost growth. Schedule risk was managed by t::e judicious use 
of concurrency during certain key phases of developr:1ent and 
testing. Performance risk was reduced by the wide use of 
proven technology from the Air Porce and other Navy prograTls. 
In devising its strategy to market the P-14D to Congress, 
the Navy had anticipated congressional concerns to foc,-,s on 
the affordability aspects of the program. Instead, 
deliberations in both the House and Senate focused on 
competition, a topic which had recently been hotly debated in 
Congress and the acquisition community. 
Even though the debate on competition never ser iously 
challenged support for the P-14D upgrade, events of the 
following year would force the Navy to address directly the 
competition issue. 
DECISION 2 - PROGRAK RESTRUCTURE 
In 1985, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings(GRH) Act was passed to 
reduce the budget deficit and federal outlays. The GRH Act 
prescribed a series of annual deficit reductions, culminating 
in a balanced budget by p."' 91. To enforce its deficit 
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reduction policy, the GRH Act established a sequestration 
process by which congressional appropriations could be 
superseded by automatic cutbacks if deficit targets were not 
met. 
The deficit reduction climate caused by GRH elevated 
' ... ;eapon systems affordability to the top of most political 
'lgendas. For defense acquisition programs, this meant 
increased scrutiny of program structure and justification by 
both OSD and Congress. 
Secretary Lehman responded to the changing fiscal climate 
caused by GRH by restructuring the F-14D program. The 
restructuring reduced the Navy's planned purchase of 304 ne'"" 
Grumman F-14Ds to a buy of 127 and initiated a remanufacture 
program to convert 400 F-14As into the F-14D configuration. 
In restructuring the F-14D program, Lehman created a "win" 
situation for all of the major acquisition participants. For 
Congress, the restructured program represented substantial 
cuts in new-production aircraft by the Navy and symbolized a 
commitment to deficit reduction. For OSO, the restructured 
program not only accelerated the introduction of the F-140 
into the fleet but also eased fiscal problems exacerbated by 
decreasing funding within the FYOP, The Navy benefitted by 
obtaining an all F-14D force. The new procurement profile for 
the F-14D program, which included 127 new production aircraft 
and 400 remanufactured aircraft represented a 73% increase in 
the number of F-14Ds available for combat. The Navy also 
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viewed the remanufacture program as an opportunity to 
introduce competition into the F-14D program. This was done 
not only to lower the overall cost of the program but to 
address criticism levied by some members of Congress during 
past deliberations. 
To offset potential opposition by the New York 
congressional delegation to new-production cuts, the )lavy 
requested 12 new F-14Ds per year through 1998. This amount of 
aircraft would ensure the production line at Grumman's Long 
Island, N.Y. facility remained open. Keeping the production 
line open at Grumman not only preserved jobs, but allowed the 
company to continue development and planning of its proposed 
next-generation fighter, the Tomcat 21. If the F-14D 
production line was closed, Grumman could be forced out of the 
aircraft business and the Tomcat 21 would never be built. 
E. DECISION 3 - PRODUCTION TERMINATION 
On 9 January 1989, just prior to leaving office, President 
Reagan submitted his FY 90 budget to Congress. Included in 
his request was $1.3 Billion for 12 new F-14Ds and six 
remanufactured F-14As. After Bush succeeded Reagan later that 
month, he announced deep spending cuts and requested agencies 
to resubmit their FY 90 budgets. For the 000 this meant a $10 
billion budget reduction. 
For David Chu, the Assistant secretary for PA&E, the 
budget resubmission offered a golden opportunity to kill new 
F~14D production. Chu was opposed to new F-14D production for 
several reasons. He believed that the unit cost of the F-14D 
... :as too high because DoD was deliberately buying aircraft in 
10'" quantities to keep the Grumman production line open. Chu 
also believed remanufacturing was a better alternative to new 
aircraft production because it invested scarce dollars into 
areas of the F-1t. which needed the most improvement. with th(C 
t,avy scheduled to receive an aircraft-carrier version of the 
Air Force's Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATf) by the year 2000, 
Chu also cautioned against procuring airframe life that would 
not be used. 
Chu found an ally in the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)), John Costello, who had 
also targeted low-volume purchases for termination. On 10 
April 1989, the DPRB decided to kill new F-14D production. 
Two ·""eeks later, the SECDEF, Richard Cheney, announced the 
termination decision in testimony before the RASC. 
Cheney's decision to cancel new F-lt,D production ·,.,'as met 
by stiff resistance in Congress. Advocates of the program, 
led by the New York congressional delegation, attaCked the 
SECDEF's termination decision not from an affordabil i ty 
viewpoint, but one of national security. Several Congressmen 
argued that the decision to terminate new F-14D production 
essentially eliminated Grumman as an airframe manufacture. 
This, they claimed, had dire consequences for both the 
industrial base and the future of naval aviation competition. 
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Several Congressmen also challenged OSD's assertion 
concerning F-l4 fighter excess. Data were presented by 
Senator D' Amato of New York which showed shortages in naval 
fighter forces beginning in the 1996-97 timeframe, if new F-
14D production was cut. This scenario, he viewed, was an 
unacceptable risk to national security. 
After joint conference deliberation on the FY 90 Defense 
Authorization Bill, a compromise was reached between the House 
and senate. The Congress authorized another year's production 
of new F-14Ds despite Cheney's decision to cancel the program. 
Why was SECDEF Cheney unsuccessful in his bid to cancel 
new F-140 production? Allison's model would suggest that he 
fai l ed to build a coalition which would ensure his decision 
was accepted. An examination of the events surrounding 
Cheney's decision tend to support this. 
From a political standpoint, Cheney's decision to cancel 
F-l4D production may have been premature. When Cheney was 
sworn into office on 17 May 1989, he immediately faced the 
prospect of having to make unpopular cuts to reshape the 
defense budget to meet Bush's fiscal guidelines. For advice, 
Cheney turned to Chu and Costello, both whom recommended 
termination of the F-l4D program. They supported their 
argument against the F-l4D strictly from a rational-analytical 
approach. Their method of ana l ysis focused on optimizing 
defense spending without regard to the political circumstances 
surrounding the decision. since consensus building was not 
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h:portant, OSD did not consult the Navy on the termination 
decision. As a result, the Service not only rebutted 050' s 
decision to cancel the program but also provided lackluster 
support for OSD's decision during congressional hearings. 
Advocates of the F-14D program, on the opposite spectrum, 
';,'ere able to build a powerful coalition, especially in the 
House, to block Secretary Cheney's decision. Representative 
Downey of Ne';,' York wielded great influence with the heads of 
the HASC and HAC. As a former member of the RASC, Downey had 
been instrumental in overturning the seniority-based system of 
electing the chairman of the committee. In 1985, he had been 
the catalyst behind Aspin's election as chairman. 
current member of the House Ways & Means Committee's trade 
subcommittee, Downey was also in a position to help the 
chairman of the HAC, John Murtha. 
Downey's trade subcommittee voted annually on the lifting 
of steel import restrictions against Japan. Passage of this 
legislation would greatly hurt Murtha's Pennsylvania 
constituency which heavily depended on the steel industry. 
The decision by Congress to fund the F-14D program despite 
OSD's request for termination, granted a temporary reprieve to 
the Grumman Corporation. Even though it had signed an 
agreement promising not to seek future new F-14D production, 
Grumman actively stepped up its lobbying campaign to push the 
F-14D. In 1990, proponents of the F-14D had convinced the 
SECNAV, H. Lawrence Garrett, of the need for the aircraft. In 
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December of that year, Garrett appeared before Congress and 
made a strong appeal for 132 new production F-14Ds. 
F. DECISION.f; - REMANUFACTURE TERMINATION 
By 1991, the denise of the Soviet Union as a superpc"ier 
had forced wholesale changes in the way the Navy vie"wed 
warfare and substantially undercut the rationale for the F-14D 
program. On 26 February 1991, Secretary Cheney announced the 
termination of the remanufacture program. 
The decision to terminate the remanufacture program "ias 
cnce again met with resistance in Congress by proponents of 
the F-14D. The House considered the request to terminate the 
program but instead chose to authorize and fund the 
remanufacture of an additional 19 aircraft. The HASC also 
authorized $50 million to initiate development of the F-14 
Quickstrike aircraft which would exploit the F-14's air-to-
ground potential. 
Even though the F-14 coalition was strong, it lacked the 
support of several strong congressional leaders. During joint 
conmittee hearings in November 1991, the F-14D program 
officially terminated by Congress. 
Secretary Cheney was successful in implementing his 
decision to terminate the F-14D program because he was able to 
weaken and split the F-14D coalition and build strong support 
for his decision. He did this by seeking approval and backing 
from the Navy's lightweight fighter lobby by offering the 
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F/A-18 EjF as an alternative to the F-14D. This eXploited the 
traditional rift between the strike-fighter and 
superiority communities. Cheney also found new allies in 
Congress from congressional leaders ',.;ho ",'auld benefit froIT. 
FjA-18 E/F development. 
His strategy also kept Congress focused on the technical 
and affordability merits of the programs vice making it a 
national security issue. Debate on the F-14D program in 
Congress often centered on comparing capabilities and cost-
effectiveness to the F/A-18 E/F. The main issues which had 
dominated congressional debates in 1989, competition a:1d 
industrial base, were rarely discussod in 1991. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions were developed as a result of 
the research effort. 
There is no clear d.istinction between policy formulation 
and policy implementation. 
Policy formulation and implementation are intertwined 
because Congress requires annual review of previously approved 
authorization and appropriations. Most programs are revisited 
every year in briefings and testimony to legislators and 
staff. Few decisions to proceed with program development are 
final. 
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As the defense budget shrinks, weapon systems acquisition 
program formulation and execution becomes much larger than the 
manipulation of cost, schedule, and performance. 
The Navy is both the initiator and executor of · ... 'eapon 
systems acquisition programs. This characterization yields a 
neasure of autonomy, but the Navy still must seek assistance 
from other acquisition participants to bring its acquisition 
strategy to fruition. From the 080, it receives formal budget 
approval and integration of its budget request into the 
administration's military, economic, and policy goals. From 
Congress, the Navy receives broad political support and 
continued funding. The Service, therefore, must define, 
defend, and execute weapon systems acquisition programs in 
such a manner that it achieves the desired outcomes of all 
major parties. 
congressional criticism of weapon systems acquisition 
programs is often the result of power struggles among 
inCii viduals or coa11 tions. 
Some members of Congress advance their own agendas at the 
expense of weapon systems acquisition programs. The Progran 
Manager must try to determine the underlying basis for the 
criticism when it occurs. Criticism should never be taken 
lightly. What may seem like a minute or insignificant problem 
can easily be taken out of context and blown out of 
proportion. Knowledge of where a Congressman stands on an 
iE;sue is key because it allows the Program :1anager to tailor 
his response to address the concerns of the critic. 
Weapon systems proqrams normally 40 not stan4 solely on 
their own tecbnical merits. 
strong technical justification for a weapon system prograTf\ 
must be aligned with a political strateqy to garner 
congressional support and funding. A political strategy, for 
example, may include addressing congressional concerns over 
affordability, waste, competition, and the industrial base. 
To understan4 the dynamics bebln4 pOlicy formulation and 
implementation, it is necessary to understan4 the environment 
in which decisions are made. 
The environment in which defense acquisition occurs is 
shaped, in large measure, by the roles, objectives, and 
perspectives of its major participants. For 000 and OSD, 
acquisition programs are initiated to correct 'w'arfighting 
deficiencies to fulfill a mission need. Since resources are 
constrained, programs not only have to offer high performance, 
but must also be affordable and cost-effective. These 
requirements lead to program formulation and implementation 
strategies which are designed to prevent programmatic 
dysfunction. 
For Congress, the acquisition process encompasses more 
than the buying of a weapon to fulfill a mission need. 
Congress satisfies various socio-economic-political policies 
through the acquisition process. As a result, increased costs 
and inefficiencies often occur. The dichotomy which exists 
between Congress and DoD often leads to instability in the 
acquisition process. 
Decisions affecting the survival of weapon system programs 
will continue to :be affected by factors external to the 
program. 
Factors external to the weapon systems program such as the 
budgetary and economic climate, external threat, and political 
conditions are constantly changing and can significantly 
affect that acquisition program. Program Managers must 
constantly monitor and evaluate risks in the external 
environment. Knowledge about the political and legal 
environment within which the program exists, will allow a 




TOMCAT MODIFICATION CASE STUDY 
BIRTH OF THE F-14A 
Battles fought in the Pacific Theater during y,'orld War II 
demonstrated the strategic importance of naval maritime force 
projection. Dominant naval forces were able to establish 
their own lines of communication (LOC) , disrupt or sever the 
enemy's LOC, choose the time and place of offensive action, 
and, most importantly, carry the war to the enemy's homeland. 
By the end of the war, airpower had become the dominant 
factor in the Pacific Theater. Naval battles were no longer 
fought between surface combatants, but at extended range by 
aircraft launched from opposing carriers or nearby islands. 
As a result of changing naval tactics, the battleship soon 
becarr.e obsolete, and the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) 
rose to become the linchpin of U.S. Naval force projection. 
By the late 1950's, the U.S. Navy had over 50 aircraft 
carriers in service [Ref. l:p. 24J. The large number of 
aircraft carriers in the U.S. Navy did not go unnoticed by the 
soviet union. As Cold war tensions increased, the soviet 
Naval Aviation (SNA) incorporated the use of long-range 
bombers into its mar it ime strategy. More signi f icantly, the 
soviets were on the verge of producing offensive air-to-
surface cruise missiles capable of hitting targets up to 150 
miles away [Ref. 2:p. 2]. Soviet bombers, armed with these 
stand-off cruise missiles, could attack U.S. aircraft carriers 
prior to engagement by conventional fighters. 
The expanding Soviet bomber force, along with the growing 
cruise missile capabi 1 i ty, was becoming more than the current 
F-4 fighter could defend against. Naval strategists 
recognized the shortcomings of the F-4 and began planning for 
a new, long-range fleet air defense fighter. The Navy 
required an aircraft that could carry a large quantity of air-
to-air missiles, have the endurance to remain on combat air 
patrol for several hours, and was capable of defeating Soviet 
bombers before they could launch their missiles at the 
American carriers. [Ref. 3:pp. 10-15] 
The Navy's first two attempts at developing an aircraft to 
meet the requisite features of its next fighter were 
unsuccessful. The first proposed candidate, the Douglas F-6D 
Missileer, lacked versatility and was canceled by the 
Eisenhower Administration in 1960. The second candidate 
aircraft, the Gr\lllllllan F-l11B, was a naval variant of the 
General Dynamic F-lll strike aircraft. The F-111B was built 
to carry the AWG-9 intercept radar and the AIM-54 Phoenix 
long-range air-to-air missile which was capable of destroying 
enemy bombers before they came within range of the fleet. 
After experiencing numerous performance and weight growth 
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problems, the F-1l1B was deemed unsuitable for carrier 
operations. [Ref. 4 :pp. 1-5J 
As Department of the Navy and congressional support waned 
for the F-lllB, Grumman proactively submitted an unsolicited 
proposal, Design ]03, as an alternative to the F-11lB. This 
ne .... design proposal would incorporate the F-11l's enginElS, 
' .... eapen systen, and variable sweep wing concept and place them 
on a mere capable airframe. This design would later become 
kno·wn as the F-14 Tomcat. [Ref. 4:pp. 3-5J 
PROCUREMENT PLAN 
On January 14, 1969, only six rnonths after the formal 
cancellation of the F-1l1B program, Grumman Aerospace 
Corporation was awarded a contract to build the F-14 as the 
Navy's next air superiority aircraft. The Navy negotiated 
separate contracts with Hughes Aircraft for the avionics 
systems and Pratt & Whitney for the engines. These two major 
items would be provided to Grumman as Government FurnishEld 
Equipment (GFE). [Ref. 4:p. 9J 
In retrospect, the most significant element of the F-H, 
contract was its engines. The F-14 was designed around the 
Advanced Technology Engine which would not be available in 
time for initial production. In order to get the aircraft 
quickly to the fleet, the Naval Air Systems Command sanctioned 
a modified version of the F-I11B engine for use in the Tomcat. 
This engine, the TF-30-P-4l2, would be installed in only the 
99 
first 67 F-14's until Pratt & Whitney delivered its ne',.; 
Advanced Technology Engine in 1970 [Ref. 5:p. lJ. Tl"\ese 
aircraft would be designated as F-14A's. 
At the end of the F-14A production cycle, it was assumed 
the new F-401 ATE would be ready. Plans called for 643 more 
aircraft to be produced with the new engine [Ref. 6:p. 1J. 
These aircraft would be the F-14B model. Later plans called 
for a F-14C model with improved avionics. 
Pratt and Whitney was unable to deliver the F-40l ATE in 
As state of the art technology, the F-401 ATE 
developed problems in the areas of reliability, endurance, and 
ability to withstand rapid throttle movement. By 1971, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense had reduced the planned 
number of F-14s to 301 because of technical problems and cost 
overrun in the F-401 ATE program. [Ref. 6:p. 2J 
As problems continued to mount for the Advanced Technology 
Engine, the Navy continued to push back the expected delivery 
date for the F-401 ATE. Eventually, the Navy concluded that 
the cost of bringing the F-401 ATE to an acceptable level of 
reliability and performance was prohibitive. In March of 
1974, the Navy decided to terminate the F-401 ATE program. 
When the F-401 ATE program died, so did the F-14B and F-14C 
follow-on programs. [Ref. 6:p. 3] 
The decision to cancel the F-401 ATE meant that all future 
production lots Of the F-14 would be equipped with the older, 
less satisfactory TF-30 engine. The Pratt & Whitney TF-30 
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eng ine had many faults which hindered the performance of the 
F-14. The engine was underpowered and lacked the thrust 
necessary to launch the aircraft from its carrier or to 
respond rapidly in aerial combat. The F-14A had to depend on 
an afterburner attached to the tailpipe of the engine to 
increase its power or thrust. Not only did afterburners add 
unnecessary weight to the aircraft, but its use also consumed 
large amounts of scarce fuel. Continued use of the aircraft's 
afterburner significantly increased the risk of engine 
compressor stall. [Ref. 1:pp. 38-39] 
The TF-30 engine had poor throttle response and very small 
stall margin which made carrier landings both difficult and 
precarious. The reliability and maintainability of the engine 
was extremely poor. For every hour of flying time, Naval Air 
System Command estimated the fighter required about 49 man-
hours of maintenance work [Ref. 7:p. 30]. Failure in the fan 
sections of the engine caused in-flight fires which resulted 
in the loss of several aircraft [Ref. 8:p. 1]. To address its 
continued concerns with the TF-30 engine, the Navy instituted 
the F-14 Survivability Improvement Program to examine the F-
14' s engine reliability problem. 
Even though several improvements were made by the engine 
manufacturer to correct safety shortcomings of the TF-30 
engine, a permanent solution to remedy the F-14 engine 
deficiency was stalled. Studies undertaken in the late 1970'S 
to provide the F-14 with its true design thrust engine went 
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nowhere because of the emergence of a new internal threat, the 
lightweight fighter lobby. 
LIGHTWEIGHT PIGHTER LOBBY 
By the early 1970's, the high cost of the F-14A and its 
Phoenix weapon system had convinced many legislators that a 
large inventory of smaller, less expensive aircraft would 
better meet national defense needs. These legislators, led by 
Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin and Senator Symington, 
the former Secretary of the Air Force, fel t they had a better 
plan for the future of military aviation and set out to 
advance their case for a new lightweight fighter. 
September 1973, The Senate Armed Services committee gave its 
guidance to the Department of the Navy on this issue: 
The committee believes the Navy should examine the 
potential of a completely new aircraft as a possible 
alternative to the F-14 in the out-years. The Navy should 
obtain proposals to determine if a smaller and presumably 
cheaper aircraft can be designed to serve as an air 
superiority fighter to complement the F-14. Once this 
determination has been made, the committee desires to 
receive the Navy determination, including the costs of 
such alternatives as well as a technical evaluation. 
[Ref. 9:p. 31] 
The Navy's response to this guidance was the formation of a 
study group to examine the potential of a lightweight fighter 
to be the F-l4 complement. 
Navy Fighter Study IV was the final product of this groups 
review of issues facing naval aviation. One of the most 
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important findings of the study highlighted the need for a 
multi-mission aircraft possessing both fighter and long-range 
strike capability [Ref. lO:p. 3lJ. The need for a mUlti-
mission aircraft was driven not as much by need as it was by 
future affordability concerns. The escalating cost of modern 
weaponry had seemingly numbered the days of specialized 
aircraft. 
In 197~. The Navy sought proposals from the aircraft 
industry for a new lightweight mUlti-mission fighter aircraft. 
Congress intervened in the acqUisition process and directed 
the Navy to investigate versions of the General Dynamics YF-16 
and Northrop YF-17 lightweight fighter prototypes, then under 
evaluation by the U.S. Air Force, [Ref. IO:pp. 32-36J 
The Navy concluded that the General Dynamics design based 
on the F-16 was unsuitable for carrier operations. In the 
interim, McDonnell Douglas, with its expertise in building 
aircraft for the Navy, had teamed with Northrop to build the 
F/A-IS aircraft based on the Northrop YF-17 design. [Ref. I:p. 
54J This aircraft, with minor modifications to its engines, 
fit the requirements sought by the Navy. The F/A-IS aircraft 
was selected by the :-Javy as its premier strike fighter 
aircraft. McDonnell Douglas would be the prime contractor and 
Northrop, the associate, The F/A-IS had unusually strong 
support from several Congressmen who felt responsible for its 
inception. Leading the congressional support for the F/A-1S 
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was Senator symington, whose district in Missouri included the 
l{cDonnell-Douglas corporate headquarters. [Ref. IO:pp. 32-36] 
The lightweight fighter lobby within the Department of the 
Navy considered the F-14 a potential threat to the existence 
of the F/A-IS. Navy actions implied that no improvements to 
the F-14 could be made which might make the F/A-18 look 
unnecessary, inefficient, or too costly for the capability 
provided. Continued development of the F-14 beyond its 
initial configuration model was significantly curtailed. 
Money for engine upgrades and the development of the F-14 air-
to-ground capability was diverted to the F/A-IS program. 
Since the F/A-IS was the designated strike-fighter for the 
Navy, the Service went as far as to discourage F-14 
contractors from distributing photographs of their aircraft 
carrying air-to-ground ordnance. [Ref. l:p. 551 
The paucity of funds to perform much needed upgrades to 
the F-14A would continue for several years. It was not until 
FY 77 that Congress would authorize money to conduct research 
and development for a new F-14 engine [Ref. 11:p. 1J. By this 
date, at least six aircraft had been lost directly due to 
engine problems [Ref. 12:pp. 9-15] 
D. THE F-110 ADVANCE TECHNOLOGY ENGINE 
The F-14 procurement plan had originally called for 
limited production of the F-14A, followed by extensive 
production of the F-14B, with improved engines. A version 
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designated F-14C had also been envisioned as a follo' .. -on in 
the late 1970's. It was to have improved avionics, radar and 
fire control systems, but this program died in the conceptual 
stages along with the F-401 engine and the F-14B. [Ref. 5:p. 
The breakthrough for a new fighter engine for the F-14A 
carne with the development of the General Electric Fl:)1 
Derivative Fighter Engine (DFE) originally designed as a 
replacement for the C.S. Air Force F-15 and F-16 fighters. A 
'laval version of this engine, the GE FI10-400, would findlly 
provide the 1"-14 with many of the critical features it h2.d 
been missing. 
The General Electric F-110-GE-400 Advanced Technology 
Engine was able to produce over 27,100 pounds of thrust, a 30% 
increase in combat rated thrust over the TF-30 engine :Ref. 
l:p. 42]. Use of the new engine eliminated the need for 
afterburners on catapult launches. Fuel savings increased 
time on station for combat air patrol missions by 34%. This 
translated into an estimated 31 minutes of combat air patrol 
loiter time at 150 nautical miles(mn) or a patrol radius 
extension of 114nm [Ref. l:p. 42J. The F-II0 engine had no 
restriction for angle of attack operations and was able to 
increase the speed and acceleration of the aircraft throughout 
its flight envelope. Throttle restrictions were eliminated as 
were bothersome engine compressor stalls which haunted the TF-
30 engine. with the F-110, the Navy had finally found an 
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engine to make the F-14 the total air superiority fighter it 
was envisioned to be. 
E. THE NEED FOR A NEW FIGHTER 
The crucial impetus for the first ma j or upgrade to the 
F-14 would finally come in the early 1980's, from the new 
Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman. Considered acerbic and 
overly ambitious, Lehman was nonetheless both a skilled 
politician and staunch proponent of naval power. 
As Secretary of the Navy, Lehman pushed a maritime 
strategy agenda which was predominately offensive in nature. 
He believed that the reason we had a Navy was to fight the 
Soviets, offensively, by assembling and sending carriers 
forward. During the initial phase of maritime strat egy 
execution known as "seizing the initiative", carrier battle 
groups (CVBG) would establish sanctuaries to conduct 
operations. The predominant fighter mission during this phase 
was defending the CVGB and other maritime assets from Soviet 
airborne threats, such as bombers and cruise missiles. For a 
fighter to be effective in this environment, it required 
endurance, supersonic performance, a powerful radar, extremely 
sophisticated avionics, and multi-shot weapon capability. 
[Ref. 14:p. 103] 
During follow-on phases of the maritime strategy, power 
pro jection strike support became the dominant fighter mission. 
Here, the fighter was required to defeat sophisticated enemy 
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air defense threats and take the battle to the enemy through 
offensive actions. To operate effectively in a power 
projection arena, a fighter needed an excellent turn rate, 
endurance, overland lookdown radar, quality medium and short 
range weapons, and self-protection avionics. [Ref. 14:pp. 
103-104J 
Even though many of the dual mission requirements inherent 
in the maritime strategy were met by the F/A-18, its 
relatively short range, low-power radar, and air-to-air 
limitations suggested a more specialized fighter was needed to 
conduct the outer air battle. 
On 9 December, 1982, the Navy Decision Resource Board 
(ORB) determined that an upgrade to the F-14A, designated the 
F-14D, was the most cost-effective method to improve carrier 
battle group outer air battle effectiveness [Ref. 14:p. 11]. 
The F-14A aircraft, which had been in production with the same 
basic configuration since 1969, was rapidly becoming obsolete 
due to soviet advances in bomber technology, long-range cruise 
missiles, and electronic countermeasures. The decision was 
confirmed in a secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) memorandum of 6 
July 1983, which delineated the required performance 
capabilities of the upgraded F-14. Requirements included 
higher thrust and more reliable engines to increase tactical 
effectiveness against advanced threats and to correct 
significant operational and safety problems associated with 
the TF-30 engine; new avionics to incorporate Department of 
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Defense directed inter-operability programs7 and an upgraded 
radar to ensure multi-target, multi-shot capability existed in 
the more severe ECM environment projected for the future. 
[Ref. 5:pp. 1-5] 
In addition to the performance requirements, Lehman's 
memorandum also gave guidance in the areas of schedule and 
cost. The acquisition schedule of the F-14D was driven by the 
need to get the aircraft into the field as quickly as possible 
due to the emerging soviet Naval Aviation threat. The Navy's 
ambitious plans called for a full-scale development effort of 
five years, followed by fleet introduction of the new aircraft 
in Fiscal Year 1990 [Ref. 15:p. 37]. The F-14D's schedule 
represented a 50% reduction in the time normally required for 
acquisition programs during this era. Cost for the F-14D 
development program was capped by the secretary of the Navy at 
$S55M [Ref. 14 :p. 7J within this threshold, limitations were 
set at $750M for the contractor and 105M for Navy in-house 
costs [Ref. 16=p. 11) 
F. THE DEVELOPMBHT OP TO P-14D 
Due to the requirements imposed by the Secretary of the 
Navy, only one viable contractor, Grumman Aerospace 
Corporation of New York, possessed the requisite design skills 
and production facilities to manufacture the F-l4D. In July 
1984, the U.s. Navy and Grumman signed an incrementally funded 
fixed price full scale development contract for the design, 
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development, and qualification of the F-l4D. The upgrade of 
the F-l4A to the F-l4D essentially was comprised of three 
elements: engine, avionics, and radar. 
l. Engine 
The engine upgrade involved removing the TF-JO engines 
manufactured by Pratt & Whitney, and replacing them with the 
General Electric F-llO-GE-400 Advanced Technology Engine. As 
previously discussed, the F-110 engine offered substantial 
increases in operability, safety, mission effectiveness, 
durability, and maintainability over the troublesome TF-JO 
engine. 
since the basic F-IlO engine had been flight tested in 
the F-l4A with excellent results and had undergone extensive 
flight testing under the Air Force development program, the 
secretary of the Navy also approved an Engineering Change 
Proposal to install the engine in a limited number of new and 
retrofitted F-14A airframes (Ref. 17:p. 4]. This modification 
would be called the F-14A+. The requirement for the F-14A+ 
was necessitated by the safety and operability problems 
associated with the TF-JO engine. 
2. Avionics 
The avionics upgrade replaced the 1960's vintage 
analog system with a new digital system architecture. other 
avionics changes included a Joint Tactical Information 
Distribution System (JTIDS) for secure communication and 
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battlefield information: an advanced Self Protection Jamming 
system (ASPJ) and a new Radar warning Receiver (ALR-67) for 
improved defensive electronic countermeasures: and the Infra-
red Search and Track (IRST) for long-range air-to-air target 
detection [Ref. 14 :p. 11]. The F-14D also incorporated 
advanced control and display techniques, similar to those 
designed for the F/A-18, to decrease the pilot workload. One 
technique, called Hands on Throttle and stick (HOTAS). allowed 
the pilot to perform cockpit chores without removing his hands 
from the primary controls [Ref. 13:p. 106]. Another, the 
improved Heads up Display (HUD), allowed the pilot to read his 
flight instruments and status display without looking down 
into the cockpit [Ref. 13:pp. 105-106]. 
3. Radar 
The installation of a new AN/APG-71 radar in the F-~4D 
offered a six-fold processing improvement over the F-14A's 
analog system and improved target detection and tracking 
capabilities in a heavy enemy electronic countermeasures 
environment by 40 percent [Ref. 13;p. 105]. 
The F-14D was designed to be a tremendous improvement 
over the original F-l4A. The entire package of upgrades would 
allow the F-14D to perform its air superiority mission for the 
fleet well into the 21st century. 
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a.. ACQUISI'l'ION S'l'RA'l'EGY 
The F-14D was developed under a fixed price, not-to-exceed 
(NTE) contract with specific guidance from the Secretary of 
the Navy to avoid all possible configuration changes after 
program initiation. The total buy of new F-14D aircraft was 
established at 304 aircraft. There were to be purchases of 7 
F-14Ds in Fiscal Year (FY) 1988, 18 in FY89, 30 for FY 90-97, 
and 39 in FY98 [Ref. 14:p. 10]. The contact called for the 
first F-14D to be delivered in March 1990. 
To manage the key variables of cost, schedule, and weapon 
system performance of the F-14D program, several of the 
following concepts were integrated into the acquisition 
strategy by the Program Manager. 
1. COllllllonality 
The F-14D program was designed to reduce cost and 
minimize risk by using systems that were common with other 
Navy and Air Force aircraft. This would allow the F-14D to 
benefit from development efforts which were already underway, 
or which had been completed by other aircraft programs. 
Additional benefits would also be gained in the form of 
reduced production and logistics support costs as a result of 
their commonality. 
virtually all the major systems in the F-14D had 
extensive commonality with other aircraft. The General 
Electric F-llO-GE-400 engine used in the F-14D was nearly 
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identical to the Air Force F-l lO -GE-lOO engine used in the F-
16 fighter. There was an 80% commonal i ty of parts between the 
engines [Ref. l5:p. 37] . The Department of the Navy was able 
to greatly reduce the technical risk in the F-14D program by 
selecting the derivative of an aircraft engine which had 
recently completed over several thousand hou rs of testing. 
A considerable portion of the new F-14 avionics s uite 
was common to the F/A-18, AV-8B, and A-6E aircraft. Common 
avionics systems included the AN/AYK-l4 computer, ALR-67 radar 
warning receiver, AN/ALQ-l65 airborne self-protection jammer, 
ASN-130 i nertial navigation system, and a multitude of other 
components. The planned av ionics weapon replaceable assembl y 
(WRA) commonality with existing aircraft was over 80 percent. 
[Ret. l5:p. 37 ] 
The Hughes APG-7l digital signal processing radar not 
only used seven of fourteen weapon replaceable assemblies from 
its ana l og AWG-9 radar derivative but also utilized many of 
the improvements developed for the USAF F-15 multi-stage 
improvement program. [ Ref. l4:p. 12] 
2 • Concurrency 
Due to the compressed acquisition cycle mandated by 
the Secretary of the Navy, schedule risk was considered 
moderate to high for the F-14D program. To ameliorate 
schedule risk, the Program Manager planned to concurrently 
develop and produce the aircraft. Not only would concurrency 
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ensure an earlier introduction of the F-~4D into the fleet but 
also keep the Grumman F-~4 production line operating at its 
minimum economic efficiency rate of one aircraft per month. 
3. Preplanned Product Improvement 
Every major subsystem involving target acquisition, 
identification or targeting was purchased directly by the Navy 
and provided to Grumman as Government Furnished Equipment 
(GFE). Many of these Department of Defense directed programs 
(JTIDS, ASPJ, and IRST) were still in development and posed 
considerable risk to the F-~4D program should their 
development lag (Ref. ~8:pp. 31-32J. To alleviate this 
schedule risk, the Program Manager adopted a preplanned 
product improvement strategy which allowed other 
radar/avionics objectives to be met, independent of the status 
of the directed programs. The F-14D aircraft would be 
designed and configured to incorporate these directed program 
improvements at a future date, if necessary. 
". Cost Reduction 
The full-scale development contract with Grumman 
included the procurement and integration of engines, radar, 
and a digital avionics system as well as the integration of 
all GFE systems. To reduce the government's risk to cost 
growth, a fixed-price with economic price adjustment contract 
was used. Even though fixed-price contracts are normally 
considered too risky for high technology programs, the Navy 
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felt the low amount of RDT&E needed combined with the 
suff iciency of cost control history for Grumman made the 
fixed-price type contract a sound choice. 
By using a fixed-price contract, Grumman was obligated 
to deliver the terms of the contract, regardless of the actual 
cost. This shifted the majority of the financial risk from 
the Navy to Grumman. If Grumman's actual cost to deliver the 
aircraft was greater than the contractual price, the 
contractor lost money. conversely, if Grumman's actual cost 
was lower than the contractual price, a profit was made. 
Grumman was motivated to contain cost growth within the 
program to obtain greater profit. 
The Department of the Navy, as the major advocate for 
the F-14D, saw the aircraft as a low cost, high performance 
replacement for the F-14A in the outer air battle. As such, 
the acquisition program was designed to manage the key 
parameters of cost, schedule, and performance. Program cost 
during full-scale development, for example, were capped by the 
Secretary of the Navy. Cost reduction strategies such as the 
use of fiXed-price type contracts, commonality, and preplanned 
product improvement were also used to limit cost growth. 
Schedule risk was managed by the judicioUS use of concurrency 
during certain key phases of development and testing. 
Performance risk was reduced by the wide use of proven 
technology from the Air Force and other Navy programs. 
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THE F-14D IS PRESENTED TO CONGRESS 
Armed with a validated mission need and approval for the 
[-140 aircraft's development from the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, the Navy requested large scale increases in RDT&E 
funding from Congress for Fiscal Year 1985 (FY 85). 
In devising its strategy to market the F-14D to Congress, 
the Navy had anticipated congressional concerns to focus on 
the affordability aspects of the program. Instead, 
deliberations in both the House of Representatives and Senate 
focused not on the affordability of the program, but on the 
improved safety aspects of the program and competition. 
In the House Appropr iations Committee, Representat i ves 
Young of Flor ida and Addabbo of New York set the tone for 
deliberations on the F-140 program by focusing on the TF-30 
engine. 
Mr. YOUNG. I am wondering why we don't write the engines 
[TF-3DJ off as a bad deal, sell them to somebody or scrap 
them, and take out the parts or put new engines in a good 
airplane to make the airplane reliable ... when you think 
about losing the life of the crew, and it is a two-man 
crew in this airplane, I don't know, sometimes you have to 
take your losses and you cut and run. You [Admiral 
SchoultzJ have confirmed the fears about the TF-30 engine 
that I have heard from some of your people that fly them. 
[Ref. 19:p. 347J 
Likewise, in the Senate Armed Services committee, the 
F-14D program found an advocate in Senator John Warner, the 
former Secretary of the Navy. senator Warner not only 
highlighted the performance improvements of the F-140 engine 
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over its TF-30 predecessor during testimony, but advocated 
accelerating this portion of the upgrade program. 
senator WARNER. You have to wait until 1987 [to upgrade 
the engine]? 
Admiral SCHOULTZ. To put them in the airplane. Hopefully 
they will start buying them before that. The problem is 
trying to get everything underneath the tent money wise. 
We hope to have a balanced program. 
Senator WARNER. I would like to have the Secretary of the 
Navy provide me with a program for upgrading that airplane 
in a period shorter than 1987. If it is fiscal 
considerations, then we can address those here in the 
Congress. If it is conditional funding for R&D, likewise 
we can address that here in Congress. From my own point 
of view, I think it is unacceptable to have a program that 
was initiated back in the early seventies and still be not 
fulfilled here in the eighties. [Ref. 20:p. 2066] 
In the Senate Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations, 
deliberations on the F-14D was dominated by discussion on 
competition, a topic which had recently been hotly debated in 
Congress and the acquisition community. senator Ted Stevens, 
Chairman of the committee, openly questioned the Navy's 
t:lethodology for selecting the F-110 engine: 
senator stevens. The Air Force is still buying F-IOOs. 
They have not told us that they are going to stop buy ing 
F-IOOs. You have just selected the F-l10 without any kind 
of competition for your use. 
Admiral Schoultz. Yes, sir. We had an option to go 
either one, and this one fits into that aircraft very 
well, and does all of the things we need to do ••.. 
senator Stevens. The Air Force has been touting very 
heavily to us the cost savings that have come about from 
their competition. Your numbers were not included in 
their competition. Why didn't you compete? 
Admiral Busey. There were options in the Air Force 
competition for Navy aircraft ... The Secretary's guidance 
to us a year ago was that we will select an engine from 
the Air Force competition. Therefore, the competition 
knew all along that the Navy was going to make a 
selection, and that we would not run our own competition. 
[Ref. 21:pp. 196-197] 
Questions submitted by advocates of the F-14D such as 
Senator D' Amato of New York, tried to defuse the competition 
issue. 
Question. Please describe the provision(s) of the Air 
Force's request for proposal for its engine competition 
which put the competitors on notice that the Navy would be 
making its engine selection on the basis of the Air 
Force's competition. 
Answer. The USAF request for proposals did address Navy 
production quality options. Bath the General Electric and 
the Pratt,. Whitney proposals included acknowledgement of 
the RFP line item and provided not-to-exceed (NTE) priced 
options for the Navy engines. 
Question. Did the Navy receive any protests or comments 
concerning its decision to base its engine selection on 
the Air Farce progress? 
Answer. The Navy received no formal protests nor 
substantive comments on its decision to base its engine 
selection on the Air Force competition. There was 
certainly full awareness of the Navy's intention to do so, 
based on wide circulation of the contents of the Secretary 
of the Navy's Memorandum dated 6 July 1983. [Ref. 21:pp. 
262-263] 
congressional testimony and debate on the F-14D tended to 
skirt the issues of affordability dUring its first major 
discussion before Congress. congressional advocates for the 
F-14D attempted to sell the safety merits of the program to 
their colleagues. In doing so, they hoped to equate support 
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for the F-14D program with support for operational safety 
within the military. Other members of Congress, such as 
Senator Stevens openly questioned specific aspects of the 
program such as competition. In the end, the F-14D program 
received the full amount of funds requested; it had passed its 
first major hurdle. 
I. GRAKH-RUDMAH-HOLLINGB 
When President Reagan entered office in 1981, he targeted 
a balanced budget as a key objective of his administration. 
Speaking on this subject, in his first inaugural address, 
Reagan stated: 
For decades we have piled deficit upon deficit, 
mortgaging our future and our children's future for the 
temporary convenience of the present. To continue this 
long trend is to guarantee tremendous social, cultural, 
political and economic upheavals ..• It is time to •.. get 
government back within its means, and to lighten our 
punitive tax burden. And these will be our first 
priorities, and on these principles, there will be no 
compromise. [Ref. 22:p. 72] 
By 1985, however, the federal deficit had nearly tripled 
in amount and doubled as a percentage of Gross National 
Product [Ref. 22:p. 5]. In a bid to reduce the budget deficit 
and federal outlays, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings(GRH) Act of 
1985 was passed. The GRH Act prescribed a series of annual 
deficit reductions, culminating in a balanced budget by Fiscal 
Year 1991. To enforce its deficit reduction policy, the GRH 
Act established a sequestration process by which congressional 
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appropriations could be superseded by automatic cutbacks if 
deficit targets were not met. 
The GRH Act threw not just the F-14D, but the entire 
future of Naval aviation into doubt. 
Senator Sasser .... By the final year of Gramm-Rudman, in 
1991, I see the Navy plans to increase the number of 
aircraft procured by 55 percent. Now how does the Navy 
realistically expect to achieve that goal in view of the 
budget trends of fewer dollars for defense? 
Admiral Martin. We are looking at trying to maintain, 
within the fiscal constraints that we have, a balanced and 
affordable program. Our budget that we are lying out for 
the 5-year defense plan is one that we think is achievable 
and is executable wi thin the fiscal constraints that we 
have. But it is going to take a lot of moving and very 
careful management of our resources. [Ref. 23:p. 206] 
Even though the Gramm-Rudmann-Hollings Act would later be 
overturned by the Supreme Court, the budgetary debates that 
followed GRH enactment started a trend in reduced defense 
spending, the impact which would be felt throughout the 
defense community. 
J. PROGRAM RBSTROCTURIlfQ 
The original aoquisition strategy for the F-14D weapon 
system called for the production· of 304 new airoraft. The 
changing fiscal climate caused by the Gramm-Rudmann-Hollings 
legislation; however, forced the Secretary of the Navy to 
revisit the original F-14D production objectives. On 17 
September 1986, Lehman directed that procurement of new-
production F-14Ds would be supplemented with the remanufacture 
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of F-14As into F-14Ds (Ref. 24:p. 13]. This change, he hoped, 
would not only speed the introduction of the F-140 into the 
fleet but also ease fiscal problems exacerbated by decreased 
funding within the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). 
On 25 November 1986, A Program Change Approval Document 
was signed changing the total quantity of F-14D aircraft to be 
procured from 304 to 527 [Ref. 17:p. 4]. To execute Lehman's 
guidance in the most effective manner, the Navy cut its 
purchase of 304 new Grumman F-140s to a buy of 127 [Ref. 17:p. 
4]. The Navy's new procurement schedule called for the 
purchase of seven F-140s in Fiscal Year 1988 and then annual 
procurement of 12 aircraft through 1998 [Ref. 25:p. 18]. The 
Navy's request for 12 new F-140s per year was based on the 
need to offset projected attrition of fleet aircraft and to 
maintain a minimum economic production rate at Grumman's Long 
Island, N.Y. facilities [Ref. 25:p. 18]. 
The Navy also planned to remanufacture 400 F-14As into the 
F-140 configuration beginning in 1990. Under the F-14D 
remanufacturing program, selected F-14A aircraft would be 
administratively stricken from the Navy's inventory and 
provided as government furnished material to the contractor. 
The remanufacture of the F-14A would include rewiring, 
overhaul, and service-life extension as well as the 
installation and integration of the new radar, avionics, and 
engine. The remanufactured F-140 would be identical in 
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performance and configuration to a new-production aircraft. 
[Ref. 26:p. 235] 
The Navy also viewed the remanufacture program as an 
opportunity to introduce competition into the F-14D program. 
This was done not only to lower the overall cost of the 
program but to address criticism levied by some members of 
Congress during past deliberations. The acquisition strategy 
directed that the first lot of six aircraft would be split 
between Grumman and a second source. Grumman was non-
competitively awarded a contract to remanufacture four 
aircraft with the sole purpose of developing a technical data 
package. The two remaining aircraft of the first lot would be 
remanufactured by the second source to validate the data 
package. To assure a wartime mobilization base, lot 2 would 
be equally split between Grumman and the second source. The 
remaining lots were to be competed bet .... een Grumman and the 
second source on a yearly basis. [Ref. 18: pp. 8-9] 
The new procurement profile for the F-14D program, which 
included 127 new prodUction aircraft and 400 remanufactured 
aircraft represented a 73% increase in the number of F-14Ds 
available for combat at an estimated 19% increase in cost 
versus the previous profile of 304 new production aircraft 
[Ref. 26:p. 235]. Lehman believed the new F-14D aircraft mix 
obtained the greatest .... arfighting capability for each year's 
budget and was the least .costly option available for obtaining 
an all F-14D force. 
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THE CASE AGAINST THE F- un 
By late 1988, opposition to the F-14D program began to 
emerge in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSO). The 
opposition was led by David Chu, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E). 
As Assistant Secretary for PA&E, Chu's job was to analyze 
the relative costs and merits of the major weapon systems 
purchased by the Department of Defense. The duties of the 
PA&E office were outlined ::;y one fanner Assistant Secretary 
during congressional hearings. 
As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program 
Analysis and Evaluation, my main role would be to advise 
the Secretary of Defense on issues involving force 
structure, choices between alternative weapon systems, 
scenarios on which our planning should be based, the 
capabilities of alternative forces and what they cost, and 
similar matters of central importance in defense planning. 
[Ref. 27:pp. 11-12J 
The influence of the PA&E office within the OSD had grown 
significantly during the budget-conscious years of the late 
1980's. As a member of the Defense Planning and Resources 
Board and the Defense Acquisition Board, the two primary 
decision-making forums for the 080, Chu was in a powerful 
position to influence acquisition decisions. with the defense 
budget continuing to decrease in terms of real growth, Chu's 
recommendations to cut waste and eliminate uneconomical 
programs gathered support. 
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Chu was opposed to new F-140 production. He believed that 
in an attempt to keep the Grumman production line open, the 
Department of Defense was deliberately buying aircraft in low 
quantities. The effect of this policy was to drive up the 
unit cost of each aircraft. Chu estimated that the 12 F-140 
a.ircra.ft scheduled for production in FY 89 would cost the 
government nearly $75 million each. This cost was three times 
greater than the $23 million price paid for the Navy's other 
carrier-based fighter, the F/A-18 Hornet. [Ref. 7:p. 4] 
Chu favored the continued remanufacturing of F-14 aircraft 
as a cost-effective means to upgrade the fighter fleet. 
Remanufacturing, he believed, invested scarce dollars into 
areas of the F-14 which needed the most improvement: engines, 
radar, and avionics. With the Navy scheduled to receive an 
aircraft-carrier version of the Air Force's Advanced Tactical 
Fighter (NATF) by the year 2000, Chu also cautioned against 
procuring airframe life that would not be used. A newly built 
F-14D with an estimated 25-30 year lifespan, would be replaced 
by the NATF long before its airframe fatigue life had expired. 
A remanufactured F-14D with an expected 10-15 year lifespan; 
however, would phase out nicely with the arrival of NATF. 
[Ref. 7:p. 26] 
His argument against new F-14D production was further 
bolstered by the Navy's own "Naval Aviation Requirements" 
report released in early January 1989. The report recommended 
that the mix of aircraft assigned to aircraft carriers be 
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changed, with fewer F-14s on each. More significantly, the 
report said the F-14 was the only aircraft in surplus, an 
assertion that gave Chu more ammunition to attack the program. 
[Ref. 7:pp. 26-27] 
On 9 January 1989, just prior to leaving office, President 
Reagan submitted his FY 90 budget to Congress. Included in 
his request was $1.3 Billion for 12 new F-14Ds and six 
remanufactured F-14As [Ref. 7:p. 36]. After Bush succeeded 
Reagan later that month, he announced deep spending cuts and 
requested agencies to resubmit their FY 90 budgets. For the 
Department of Defense, this meant a $10 billion budget 
reduction. 
For Chu, the budget resubmission offered a golden 
opportunity to kill new. F-140 production. He found an ally in 
the Under Secretary of Defense for ACquisition and Technology 
(USD(A&T». John Costello, who had also targeted low-volume 
purchases for termination. On 10 April 1989, the Defense 
Resources Board decided to kill new F-140 production. Two 
weeks later, the secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, 
announced the termination decision in testimony before the 
House ArIled Services Committee. 
L. 'I'D BATTLB OIl CAPUOL BILL 
Debate on the fate of the F-140 program now shifted to the 
Defense Committees of both the House and Senate. Advocates of 
the program, led by the New York congressional delegation, 
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attacked the SECDEF's termination decision not from an 
affordability viewpoint, but one of national security. 
Several congressmen argued that the decision to terminate new 
F-14D production essentially eliminated Grumman as an airframe 
manufacture. This, they claimed, had dire consequences for 
both the industrial base and the future of naval aviation 
competition. 
Senator D'Arnato. If we eliminate the F-14D, what about 
competitiveness in the future as it relates to the naval 
needs? Are we not going to have just one source? .. Mr. 
Chairman, I think what we are talking about is the 
destruction of an industrial base called Grumman that 
provides competitiveness at this time. This is just not 
a situation where we are cutting back on a plane that is 
not necessary; we are talking about a plane that is 
absolutely necessary . . . If the F-14D is eliminated, Grumman 
will no longer be able to compete as an effective force in 
air production. ( Ref. 28:pp. 391-392] 
Senator Sasser. I just want to frankly say Senator 
D'!\mato's statement about jeopardizing the future 
industrial base for Navy fighter production is persuasive 
to me. I fear that we are going down the path of the Navy 
relying on one manufacturer to meet Navy fighter needs. 
It has been my experience just watching the budget figures 
that when we start relying on solely one manufacturer the 
taxpayers end up paying a substantial premium for what 
they receive. [Ref. 28:p. 812J 
Secretary Cheney, in explaining his reasoning behind the 
termination decision, attempted to counter these assertions. 
The greater our surge capability , the greater our 
ability in peacetime to have competition between competing 
systems - all of those things are to be valued. The 
problem, of course, is how much are you willing to pay for 
that. If you look at the F-14D decision ... the new 
production line was operating at a rate of one a month, 
and the cost, ran somewhere between $51 million and $75 
million per copy, to buy 12 F-14Ds a year. This is a very 
high price to keep a production line open. Given there 
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are other contractors that are out there in the 
business ... we are indeed in a position to know that we 
will have the industrial base we need to meet our needs in 
the years ahead. [Ref. 28:pp. 44-45] 
Several Congressmen also challenged QSD's assertion 
concerning F-14 fighter excess. Data were presented by 
Senator 0' Amato of New York which showed shortages in naval 
fighter forces beginning in the 1996-97 timeframe, if new F-
140 production was cut. By the year 2007, the discrepancy was 
expected to reach 21 percent. With a three year slippage in 
NATF deliveries, the shortfall would increase to 53 percent. 
senator 0' Amato argued that the NATF was still in ':he 
conceptual phase and that experience had shown joint Navy-Air 
Force aircraft developments to be disastrous. Should NATF 
flounder, the Navy would be left without a modern air 
superiority aircraft for fleet air defense. This scenario, he 
viewed, was an unacceptable risk to national security. 
M. 'I'HE SBAJtCH POR COXPROXISB 
After deliberations ended on the amended Fiscal 1990 
Defense Authorization Bill, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee (SASe) and House Armed Services committee (HASC) 
took different directions on the F-14D issue. The SASC sided 
with the SECDEF and did not authorize funds for new F-14D 
production. The HASC, however, restored funding to the 
program. In resurrecting the F-14D, the committee expressed 
concern that termination of production "may be hastily 
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conceived and premature". The committee recommended 
procurement of 12 new F-14Ds in FY 90 and provided advanced 
procurement for 12 ne .... production aircraft the following year. 
[Ref. 29:p. 19J 
The move to restore funds to the F-14D program by the HASC 
was a serious rebuke of the Secretary of Defense. Responding 
to the committee's decision to restore funds for the F-14D, 
Cheney called the restoration "short-sighted". He believed 
the decision to keep the F-l4D line open would cost $1 billion 
more than the recommended plan to remanufacture old aircraft 
and would also result in JO% fewer F-14Ds in the Navy's 
inventory. [Ref. 30:p. 15] 
During joint conference between the House and Senate, a 
political compromise was reached. The Congress authorized 
another year's production of new F-14Ds (18 each) on the 
condition that Grumman sign an agreement stating that it would 
not seek further production of new F-14Ds [Ref. 31:p. 30]. 
This agreement, when signed by Grumman, would effectively end 
new F-l4D production at 37 aircraft. 
N. THE TERKIIII'ATIOIll' OF THE F-14D 
By 1991, the demise of the soviet union as a superpower 
had forced wholesale changes in the way the Navy viewed 
warfare. Testifying before Congress, the Secretary of the 
Navy expressed the Service's vision on modernization and force 
structure. 
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The key that makes maintaining force structure and 
modernizat ion simultaneously possible is an important 
shift in the character of the threat we are facing. Most 
significantly, for our purposes, the long range air 
de fense threat, posed by ASM carrying Backfires, Bears and 
Badgers is diminished primarily because the likelihood of 
a major confrontation with the Soviets has decreased . At 
the same time, the full integration of AEGIS into the 
fleet's air defense capabilities has improved our overall 
air defense posture. Unfortunately, we saw no similar 
change in the nature of the threat as it relates to strike 
warfare requirements. In fact, the opposite is true. The 
number of sophisticated lADS (Integrated Air Defense 
Systems] and associated weapons in the third world are 
growing. The analysis led us to conclude that we could 
afford to put less effort into AAW [Air-to-Air Warfare] 
and modernize plans in the strike warfare area. [Ref. 
32 :p. 509 ] 
On 26 February 1991, Secretary of Defense Cheney 
terminated the Grumman F-14D remanufacturing program for the 
convenience of the government. The Navy also ordered General 
Electric to end production of 24 F-II0 engines and spares for 
previously designated aircraft conversion. A cancellation 
notice also went out to Hughes which supplied the AN/APG-71 
radar for the F-14D model. [Ref. 33:p. 71] 
The main reason all production on the F-14D was ordered 
terminated was revealed a few days later when DoD announced 
that i t wanted the Navy to develop and buy new versions of the 
F/A-1S, the F/A-IS ElF . The decision to procure the F/A-IS 
ElF was questioned by many within the Navy and was openly 
criticized by former Secretary of the Navy Lehman who v iewed 
the F/A-IS as not having the range and payload required to 
perform the deep strike mission or to provide extended range 
fleet air defense. F lA-IS proponents countered these 
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criticisms by highlighting the Hornet's superior reliability, 
maintainability, survivability, and foreign military sales 
potential compared to the F-14. The Navy's decision to go 
with the F/A-18 E/F aircraft vice the F-14D was economically 
driven by OSD's decision to cut aircraft funding by nearly 
half in the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The procurement 
of the F/A-18 E/F would allow the Navy to maintain its 
projected force structure during future downsizing. [Ref. 
34:p. 25] 
In April of 1991, Grumman offered the Department of 
Defense long term price guarantees on the F-14D and F-14 
derivatives in an attempt to get the aircraft into the FY 92 
Budget. In a letter to Cheney, the Grumman Aerospace 
Corporation chairman, Renso Corporali, attempted to 
competitively price the F-14 against the F/A-18 ElF. He also 
committed Grumman to broad development of the F-14D Quick 
Strike, an F-14D derivative with added air-to-ground attack 
capabilities. Corporali's offer was seen as a last ditch 
effort on the part of Grumman to reopen the partially closed 
F-14 production line. [Ref. 35:p. 24] 
Although the proposal sounded promising, Navy officials 
questioned whether Grumman would be able to hold to its stated 
rates and prices. In the end, the proposal was rejected by 
DoD. This effectively signalled the end of Grumman's F-14D 
program. 
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APPENDIX B 
1. 'l'he Department ot the Navy, OSD, and Congress are three 
major participants in the derense acquisition process. In 
macro terms, how would you describe the functional 
relationship between these tactions? How does this 
relationship at teet the acquisition process trom the Navy's 
perspective? 
The Navy is both the initiator and executor of acquisition 
programs. This characterization yields a measure of autonomy, 
but the Navy still must seek assistance from other acquisition 
participants to bring its acquisition strategy to fruition. 
From the OSO, it receives formal approval of budgets and 
integration of its budget request into the administration's 
military, economic, and policy goals. From Congress, The Navy 
receives broad political support and continued funding. The 
service, therefore, must define, defend, and execute 
acquisition programs in such a manner that it achieves the 
desired outcomes of all parties. 
2. What is the major difference between a tilled-price and. 
cost-reimbursement type contract? Bow did the Navy justify 
using II. fixed price contract with Grumman during- tull-scale 
development considering the risks involved? 
The major distinction between fixed-price and cost-
reimbursement type contracts is in the industry's obligation 
and risk. Fixed-price contracts place the greatest obligation 
and the most risk upon industry to deliver a product at an 
agreed price. Cost-reimbursement type contracts place the 
133 
obligation upon the government. Factors to consider before 
deciding on the type of contract to pursue include the nature 
of the technology, the government resources committed to 
monitor and control the contractor, and the predicted accuracy 
of the government's cost estimate. 
3. What is concurrency? What is the objective and risk of 
using this type of aequid tiOD strategy? 
Concurrency is a scheduling strategy which combines or 
overlaps design, testing, production, and deployment 
activities. Its principal objective is to shorten the overall 
delivery schedule so that the user can obtain an earlier 
operational capability. Use of concurrency by the Program 
Manager as part of his acquisition strategy increases program 
risk. If the technology is advanced and the system is 
complex: cost growth, schedule slippage, and performance 
shortfalls are likely to occur if difficulties arise during 
production. since concurrency does entail a sUbstantial risk, 
the Program Manager must evaluate the trade-off of earlier 
capability with the potential cost, schedule, and performance 
difficulties which could occur. 
.... What acquisition strateqi •• were used by the Program 
Hanagar to alleviate cost, sohedul., aDd technical risk? 
cost reduction strategies such as the use of fixed-price 
type contracts, commonality, and preplanned product 
improvement were used to limit cost growth. Schedule risk was 
"4 
managed by the judicious use of concurrency during certain key 
phases of development and testing. Performance risk 
reduced by the wide use of proven technology from the Air 
Force and other Navy programs. 
5. The Navy was oriticized in Congress for its lack of 
competition while procuring the GE-J!'110 engine. What benefits 
can be gained from competition? 
Advantages of competition include: obtaining a lower price 
for a product, obtaining a higher-quality product, expanding 
the industrial base, stimulating research and development, and 
encouraging cost-conscious behavior. Risks were considered 
minimal because proven subsystem technology was used and there 
was sufficient cost history for both parties to project cost 
with reasonable certainty. 
6. How does Congress exert control over DoD? What role does 
budgeting play? 
The constitution of the United States gives Congress the 
power to allocate the resources of the Federal Government. 
This power gives Congress the authority to enact as well as 
oversee budget execution. Congress exercises control over DoD 
through statutory controls written into the authorization and 
appropriation acts and non-statutory controls such as 
committee reports, testimony, hearings, and oversight. 
Budgeting is a political process used by the government to 
formulate policy, establish and pursue national objectiVes, 
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promote favorable economic condit ions, and respond to the 
demand of citizens and groups . 
7. In 1989, Secretary Cheney attempted to stop new F-14D 
production. What were tbe arquments for and against baIting 
this phase of tbe upgrade? 
aso was opposed to new F-l4D product i on for several 
reasons. Arguments against tbe purchase included: 
(a) 000 was purchasing l ow quantities o f the aircraft which 
significantly drove up unit cost. 
(b) Remanufact uring was a bett er alternat i ve because it 
invested scarce dol lars into areas o f the F-l4 wh ich needed 
the most improvement. 
(c) With the Navy scheduled to receive an aircraft-carrie r 
version of the Air Force's Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF) by 
the yea r 2000, the Navy would procure airframe life that would 
not he used. 
(d) There was an excess of F-14 fighters in the fleet. None 
was needed. 
Arguments for tbe purchase included: 
(a) Termination of ne .... F-14D production essential l y eliminated 
Grumman as an airframe manufacturer. 
(b) Future competitiveness in the naval aircraft industry 
.... ould suffer if Grumman .... as eliminated as a manufacturer. 
(c) An inadequate industrial base .... ould exist i f Grumman went 
out of business. 
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(d) There was only a short term excess of F-14 fighters in the 
fleet. If new F-14D production was cut, there would be severe 
shortages in naval fighter forces. 
8. critics of Secretary Cheney's deciaion to baIt new F-140 
prodUction quel!ltioned bis laclr: of expertise in detense matters 
and bis dependence aD tbe PAiB office. Bow does tbe appointee 
l!Iystem at DoD contribute to instability in tbe decision-making 
process? 
The appointee system is seen as contributing significantly 
to instability in the decision-making and administrative 
process. Some appointees lack the expertise and experience to 
handle the complexity of weapon systems acquisition. Many 
disrupt activities while they learn something about their jobs 
and are prone to act from authority rather than knowledge. 
9. Based on this ease study, do you feel tbere is a clear 
distinction between policy fOrlllulation and implementation? 
Policy implementation is usually not cleanly separated 
from policy formulation. The sharp dividing line is not 
present because Congress requires annual review of previously 
approved authorizations and appropriations. Most programs are 
revisited every year in briefings and testimony to legislators 
and staff. Few decisions to proceed with program development 
are final. 
10. Should a program )(anager be an adVocate for his program? 
Does the current acquisition cuI ture support or encourage 
unbiased reporting by tbe Program Hanager? 
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The Program Manager is tasked by his charter to maintain 
a total Service perspective and keep the leadership appraised 
of program status, to include problems which could affect the 
Service's commitment to the program. Advocacy for a program 
becomes a problem when it interferes with this mission and 
causes unethical behavior by the Program Manager. The current 
acquisition climate does not encourage unbiased reporting. It 
is difficult for a Program Manager to evaluate subjectively 
his program when program success is often equated with career 
11. In 1991, the Navy terminated the remanufacture program for 
the convenience of the goverDJllent. What liabilities do the 
government incur through thi. action? 
When a contract is terminated for convenience, the 
contractor may recover (1) his costs of performance incurred 
up to the time of termination, (2) certain "continuing costs," 
(3) his settlement expenses, and (4) for fixed-price 
contracts, an allowance for profit (unless the contract would 
have been perfonned at loss). OVerall, the guiding principle 
for a contractor's recovery in a tennination settlement is 
that the contractor be fairly compensated for the work done 
and preparations made for the terminated portions of the 
contract. 
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What is the role and objective of PPBS? 
The PPBS is a decision-making process for allocating 
resources among a number of competing programs or alternatives 
which support national strategy. The ultimate objective of 
PPBS is to provide operational commanders with the best mix of 
forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal 
constraints. To achieve this objective, PPBS is split into 
three distinct but interrelated phases: planning, programming, 
and budgeting. 
13. What is the trade-off between weapon systems affordability 
ana rate of production? 
Economic production rates contribute to stability and 
savings by allowing a contractor to take advantage of tooling 
and plant capacity to produce additional units of a system at 
a cheaper unit cost. This allows "economies of scale" to 
Weapon systems produced in low quantities do not 
benefit from this advantage. 
14. What role doe. the DAB play in the acquisition decision-
mak.ing process? 
The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) is the primary forum 
of decision-making within the- Department of Defense (000) for 
acquisition programs. The DAB conducts management of major 
defense acquisition programs (ACAT I) as they proceed from 
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requirement and concept definition through production and 
deployment. 
Formal DAB reviews are conducted at each milestone to 
assess program accomplishments during the previous life-cycle 
phase and to assess readiness to proceed to the next phase. 
Typical issues addressed in DAB proceedings include, "cost 
growth, schedule delays, technical threshold breaches, 
supportability ~ssues, acquisition strategy, threat 
assessment, test and evaluation highlights, cooperative 
development/joint service concerns, manpower evaluation, and 
operational effectiveness/suitability." At the conclusion of 
the DAB review, the (USD(A&T)) issues his decisions and 
guidance through the Acquisition Decision Memorandum. 
15. Once the POl( completes service review, it is forwa.rded to 
the DPRB. What function does the DPRB perform and who 
some of ita key member.? 
The DPRB is a high level DoD group that assists the 
Secretary of Defense in managing the Planning, Programming, 
and Budgeting System. Key members include: the Under 
Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition & Technology (USD(A&T)) 
and Policy (USD(P), the DoD Comptroller, and the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation (ASD 
(PA&E). The DPRB's decisions regarding Service programs are 
submitted to the secretary of Defense for approval. After the 
secretary of Defense makes the final POM decisions, they are 
recorded in Program Decision Memoranda (POM). The PDM 
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approves the POM with specific changes and it becomes the 
basis for Budget Estimate Submission. 
16. What risks do the Government take in providing GFE? 
When the decision is made to provide GFE, the Government 
must manage the acquisition of the item to be furnished and 
must assume responsibility for on-time delivery, functional 
perfonnance, quality, reliability and the technical interface 
of GFE with the end item. since the Government has full 
responsibility for GFE, a contractor will be able to recover 
the extra costs caused by the Government's (a) failure to 
deliver GFE, (b) delay in delivery of GFE, or (c) furnishing 
of unsuitable GFE. 
17. What do you think motivate. oongreasional memllera to take 
a more active role in the oversight at' DOD aoquisition 
programs? 
The behavior of elected officials is driven by the 
capacity in which he or she is serving. These capacities are 
constituency, career, agency, and institution. 
constituent serving behavior is driven by the desire of 
members to address the pol i tical and economic interest of the 
voters back in there home states and districts. The desire to 
take care of parochial interest is often seen in the enactment 
of defense related legislation. The political process of 
using federal programs to benefit constituents is referred to 
as "pork barrel" politics. 
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Career serving behavior is motivated by a member's 
personal goals, desires, and ambitions. Members of Congress 
can help their careers by serving their constituents, doing 
favors for influential people, supporting their political 
party, and tending the needs of special political interest 
groups. Favors are normally returned in the form of campaign 
contributions, access to information, or reelection support. 
career serving behavior is one of the most powerful influences 
on congressional decision-making. 
Agency serving behavior is driven by a member's legitimate 
concern over the efficient and effective functioning of 
governmental agencies. The welfare of the nation and support 
of national policy objectives are the top motivator in this 
category. 
Insti tution serving behavior is similar to agenoy serving 
except the member's behavior is motivated by their desire to 
influence a legislative agenda. 
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